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Is COMPETITION POLICY POSSIBLE
IN HIGH TECH MARKETS?:
AN INQUIRY INTO ANTITRUST,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
BROADBAND REGULATION As
APPLIED TO "THE NEW ECONOMY"
Lawrence A. Sullivant
INTRODUCTION

In a widely noted address and article, Judge Richard Posner
said that "antitrust doctrine is supple enough, and its commitment
to economic rationality strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the new economy," which he defined
to include software, Internet linked businesses, and supporting
communications.! Coming from so knowing a source, these words
are a wholesome antidote to overbroad contentions that by their
contributions to dynamic efficiency high tech markets earn permissive antitrust treatment. 2
Yet, the Posnerian dictum was not intended to comfort those
t Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles, and Earl
Warren Professor of Public Law, Emeritus, University of California School of Law, Berkeley.
I Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, (Sept. 14, 2000),
at
http'//www.techlawjoumal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp [hereinafter the Posner Address). See
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTIRUST L. REV. 925 (2001) [hereinafter the PosnerArticle] (more fully developing the address by Judge Posner). See also Robert
Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Speech at the Univ. of California, Berkeley [hereinafter Pitofsky Remarks] (discussing the
role of conventional antitrust enforcement in intellectual property dependent high tech markets),
at http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofskylipf3Ol.htm (Mar. 2, 2001).
2 See e.g., Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation
and Antitrust, in
ANTTRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPErITION 55 (Jorde & Teece, eds. 1992) (discussing the
problems with the application of current antitrust law to high technology firms). See also David
J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High Technology
Industries,43 ANTrrRUST BuLL 801, 843-46 (1998) (advocating a more permissive approach to
antitrust for high technology firms).
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who value effective competition. In the somber tones of a prophet,
but with no prophetic assurance that a solution is at hand for those
with faith enough to grasp it, the judge points to a doleful irony.
Just as antitrust analysis attains maturity, the new economy confronts it with seemingly insoluble institutional problems: Despite
analytical potency, courts, and agencies lack sufficient technical
knowledge available either in-house or from unconflicted outside
experts. Perhaps worse, neither courts nor agencies can accelerate
their processes to match the dynamic rate of structural, strategic,
and performance changes in the subject markets, which are characterized by intellectual property ("IP") assets and informational
outputs resulting in high fixed, low marginal, and falling average
costs.
The purpose of this paper is not to challenge Judge Posner's
observations, but to widen the angle of vision. Part I suggests that
the proper standard for evaluating the success of antitrust is
broader than the Posner paper implies, and argues that, with a
more encompassing standard, the problems identified appear less
debilitating. It then evaluates how effective recent enforcement
has been at the antitrust-IP interface, and stresses that postChicago analytical tools, and the inherent strengths of a judicial
process open to information and analysis make application of settled antitrust rules to the new economy markets feasible, if difficult.
Part II considers the independent significance of IP to new
economy competition. It asserts that IP is of greater importance in
the new economy than in the old, because special new economy
characteristics magnify the ex post rewards of IP. It invites inquiry about whether defects in new economy competition may
arise directly out of IP regimes that are excessively protective,
especially as applied to these markets.
Part III draws upon Judge Posner's recognition that supportive broadband telecommunications are an important aspect of the
new economy. It stresses that the extent of competition in those
converging telephone, cable, and wireless technologies is more
dependent upon federal and state regulatory regimes than on the
direct application of antitrust, and notes that regulatory approaches
to broadband have not converged nearly as much as have the markets themselves. Finally, it identifies issues that must be addressed to encourage and sustain competition in broadband and
linked e-commerce and business-to-business ("B2B") markets.
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I. ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY

A. Dynamic Markets, Technical Complexity, and Static Procedure
New economy markets differ from smokestack industries in
ways that can strain conventional antitrust analysis. Not only are
they more dynamic, they are also marked by several other differences. Characteristic structural elements include: (1) high innovation costs for information assets capable of appropriation mainly
through IP; (2) resulting infeasibility of marginal cost pricing; entry barriers based on IP and network externalities; (3) recurrence
of complementary products with separate demand curves; and (4)
frequently forming and dissolving joint ventures. A special performance desideratum is the need for interoperability. 3 Also, IP
based competitive strategies and counter moves are frequently observed. 4 Because network effects are inevitable in communications and often encountered in software, all of these markets tilt
toward emergence of a dominant standard. Whether selected by
competition, cooperation, or exclusionary tactics, 5 if the standard
is proprietary, the company or consortium that controls it gains
significant power. Though battles occur among firms seeking
standard status, network effects magnify first entry and early lead
advantages and can motivate efforts to increase market penetration
regardless of current profits, in order both to increase product
value to new and old users, and to reduce costs by moving down
the learning curve and gaining scale economies. All of this makes
competitive strategies crucial and can certainly motivate exclusionary ones.
3 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change
Everything? The Competitive Proprietyof a ProprietaryStandard,43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715 (1998) (discussing the
java programming language and its impact on competition and operating systems).
4 See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RuLEs (1999) (analyz-

ing the management of intellectual property).
5 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, IncreasingReturns, and
Lock-In By
HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON J. 116 (1989) (discussing network effects in technologies competing
for adoption); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibility and Innovation,
16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985) (discussing the tradeoff between the benefits of standardization
versus the problem of being "trapped" by an obsolete standard); Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities,Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985)
(discussing network effects and consumption externalities). See generally William E. Cohen,
Competition and Foreclosure,64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535 (1996) (analyzing the economic effects of
new technology of installed base and compatibility); Catherine Fazio & Scott Stem, Innovation
Incentives, Compatibility and Expropriationas an Antitrust Remedy: The Legacy of the BorlandAshton-Tate Consent Decree, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 45 (2000) (reviewing the conceptual
framework and the Department of Justice remedy for the Borland/Ashton-Tate merger).
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Yet, Judge Posner is clearly right that antitrust doctrine is
supple enough to cope. 6 The outburst of quality scholarship on
issues relevant to new economy markets has been immense.7 The
need, as Judge Posner recognized, is to hold firmly to conventional
doctrine that forbids anticompetitive practices that will cost the
dominant firm less than their expected yield.8 But this doctrine
must be implemented by identifying and responding to the contextual dynamics encountered in the particular market involved by
using-with skepticism if called for-all relevant information and
useful analytical tools, whether or not they bear the Chicago imprimatur. For example, in evaluating a new economy joint venture
the analyst should check for possible harms and benefits and gauge
their seriousness in the conventional manner. Will the increased
concentration raise barriers? Will the information exchanged
threaten cartel effects beyond the venture? Will non-members be
prejudiced by exclusion from an important resource? Are there
offsetting efficiencies? The risk of harm may be influenced by
barriers from IP or network effects or by other special characteristics. In evaluating possible benefits such characteristics may also
loom large. Cooperation may not only make scale or transaction
cost benefits accessible, but may also yield increases in consumer
values through network effects. 9 Against this recognition-that
new economy markets can be understood and that the theoretical
resources needed to analyze their competitive effects are available-I will address the two institutional problems Judge Posner
adumbrated. But first, a discussion of standards is in order. How
should one decide when antitrust enforcement is sufficiently effective?

See PosnerArticle, supra note 1, at 93 1-33 (suggesting that the author's confidence
in
antitrust theory, though skeptical, does not deny the possibility that dominant new economy
firms, acting alone, may injure competition).
7 See, e.g., Steven Salop & David T. Scheffman,
Raising Rival's Costs, 73 AM. ECON.
REv. 267 (1983) (special edition) (discussing the theory of raising rivals' costs which forces
competitors to exit a market) and the works cited in supra notes 2-5. See also Jonathan B.
Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989) (citing and discussing relevant recent scholarship).
8 See PosnerArticle, supra note 1, at 935 (noting that in new economy markets, the likelihood of monopoly profits obtained during an extension period gained through intellectual
property rights will exceed the costs of the exclusionary practice to the monopolist).
9 As cable, telephone, computer, and content provider markets coverage,
there may also
be opportunities for efficiencies in bringing complementary resources together.
6
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1. By What StandardShould the Effectiveness ofAntitrust Enforcement Be Evaluated?
The two institutional problems Judge Posner identified, discussed in turn below, are real enough. Technological complexity
and ponderous procedural delay certainly burden big case antitrust
litigation. But the seriousness of both of these problems will vary
with differences in what one regards as the proper social contribution of antitrust enforcement. While the Posner paper did not
specify an evaluative standard, it does seem to imply one: antitrust
enforcement is effective when it achieves economically rational
remedies that correct competitive distortions resulting from misuse
of market power.10 While this is certainly an admirable top tier
goal, antitrust litigation is not solely a policy analog to an economic laboratory, fine-tuned to clear the field of conflict and policy debate, in order to find the nicely balanced solution to each
problem presented. It is, in addition, a system for resolving disputes that should be kept open to the diverse voices of myriad interested parties. In this role, it also has its own homiletic tradition,
which celebrates and reinforces values clustered around fairness
and efficiency." Antitrust enforcement should be visible and explained. Only so will it foster and encourage a commercial culture
where competitive process and openness to entry are perceived and
protected as normative. If antitrust is evaluated solely as a struggle to correctly solve specific cases, then problems resulting from
the paucity of technical information or limits on capacity to stay
abreast of a fast moving market will be amplified. But recognition
that antitrust functions as a social tutorial, that it can aid the commercial culture to internalize competitive values, will place the
matter in a wider perspective. Also, there is a relevant time dimension. A short-term goal of enforcement is to dispose of the
case at hand correctly. But some false positives and false negatives are inevitable. A long-term interest is to keep self-corrective
processes both active and visible, thus reinforcing acceptance of
and commitment to competitive values.
10This standard seems to be suggested by Judge

Posner's stress on economic rationality,
PosnerArticle, supranote 1, at 925, his commitment to Chicago school analysis, id. at 931-32,
and his opposition to "complicating" effects of state parenspatriaejurisdiction and, perhaps, of
private litigation, iU at 940-41.
See generally RUDOLPH J. PERrrZ, COMPETION POLICY iN AMERICA:
HISTORY,
RI-EORIC, LAW (rev. ed. 2000). As Professor Peritz's work reminds us, antitrust is at the
center of an ongoing public debate. Inevitably it is history, rhetoric and, most importantly, a
system for settling disputes by law as well as policy that seeks economically rational solutions.
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2. Does the Paucityof DisinterestedTechnical Expertise Greatly
Diminish Effective New Economy Antitrust Enforcement?
Judge Posner's concern that disinterested technological information is in short supply seems overdrawn and is certainly time
limited. Computer hardware, software, and networks, up to and
including the Internet, involve technologically complex engineering. Until they become relevant professionally, lawyers and
judges of any seniority need not be embarrassed to display limited
conceptual control of the latest phenomena in these fields. After
all, though the first general purpose, programmable, digital computer-the 30 ton "ENIVAC"-dates to 1945,2 the mini computer
only arrived in the mid 1960s, the microprocessor in the early
1970s, IBM personal computers ("PCs") not until 1981, compatible desktops not until the mid 1980s,1 3 and the first Windows operating system is still a fresh memory. As for the Internet, while
ARPANET, funded by the Department of Defense, dates to the late
1960s, NSNE dates only to the mid 1980s, its federal support
ended only in 1995, and exponential Internet growth began
scarcely more than a decade ago. 14 Moreover, the extent to which
non-technical people of all ages are learning not only how to use,
but how to conceptualize the design processes involved in software, hardware, and networks is, if not as astounding as is the
phenomenal development processes that mark these fields, nevertheless impressive. Continuing education programs for nonengineers in university engineering schools can and do bring participants, including economists and lawyers, to quite a high technical level. Law schools, as well as business schools, teach not only
the law but also some of the technology and competitive strategies
related to the new economy, both in regular curriculum offerings
(e.g., traditional IP, jurisdictional or procedural curses), and also in
courses like computer, software and Internet Law. 15 Moreover, in
college and graduate programs of all kinds, the digital generation
12
13
14

See JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 19 (2001).
See MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFrWARE AND INTERNET LAW 2-7 (2000).
See KANG, supranote 12, at
240-42.

An example of a jargon-free, short course in high tech electronic
fundamentals for nonelectronic professionals is The ABCs of Electronic Technology, U.C. Berkeley Extension. For
impressive examples of technology sophisticated law school teaching books, see Lemley, supra
note 13, at 1-45 (discussing computer history, computer technology, software design, interface
design and software validation and maintenance) and STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 827-65 (2001) (discussing the history and architecture of the Internet). Almost any lawyer is apt to receive numerous announcements for continuing education programs on these and related topics.
15
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has arrived.
Remember, too, that a learning curve is experienced by
courts, enforcers, and lawyers as well as by entrepreneurs when
they turn their attention to new subjects or phenomena. In the
analysis of antitrust problems, this can be observed in the movement from the excessive populism in the merger law of the 1950s
and 1960s, to the implosion of per se and rule of reason analysis in
the 1970s, to the price theory extremes of the 1980s, to postChicago analysis in the 1990s. That courts today are also learning
to understand the new economy is already exemplified in the way
they have responded to IP issues in these fields. The early cases
failed to draw a sharp line between patentable ideas and copyrightable expression. 16 But, as courts learned more about software, they
became aware that greater access to programs were needed, lest
technological development be stifled rather than advanced. 17
Cases discussed in Part I.A.3, below, suggest that judicial learning
about the special characteristics of and economics relevant to new
economy industries is also being derived from antitrust cases.
Nor are the litigation problems in the new economy different
in kind from those litigators and courts often address in the many
other contexts where law and cutting edge science or engineering
meet. Certainly there are potential values in some of Judge Posner's suggestions for mitigating some of the problems. Greater
enforcement resources might enable courts and agencies to pay
market rates for needed technological assistance.1 8 So, in some
circumstances, might his arbitration-like proposal for party selected experts to nominate a consultant for the court.1 9 But the
First,Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983),
subsumed technology into copyright. Next, Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), misconceiving the line between idea and expression in
software design, granted sweeping protection for programming ideas for a term longer than
would be available even if they could have qualified for patent protection.
17 There have now been several corrective
and mitigating responses to overbroad copyright protection for software. E.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (Ist Cir.
1995), aff'd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding that a method of operation is not copyrightable); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that technical expression is public domain, and that innovative utilitarian works containing expression are copyrightable); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that disassembly of software code to gain access to its functional elements is
a fair use under the copyright act).
18 See PosnerArticle, supra note 1, at 940. Although
Posner's suggestion that a state's
parens patriaejurisdiction be withdrawn was, as the author called it, "radical," most of the
suggestions, including those concerning agency support, adoption of arbitration, and procedure
were modest in nature and temperately presented. See infra note 19.
19 See id at 937-38 (discussing possible methods
that a court could use in selecting expert
consultants).
16
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litigation process should never be wholly dependent on disinterested technical experts who tell the court or jury the correct technical facts. Factual, even theoretical, issues about technology are
as open to debate as are such issues in, say, antitrust economics.
The way the courts should and normally do deal with them is by
hearing the conflicting stories of experts whom the parties have
screened to determine the thrust of their views, by hearing such
experts cross-examined, and then by deciding which technical
opinion is most consistent with the basic, observable facts. Antitrust litigation is not and should not become a laboratory. Like all
litigation, it is a system for resolving conflicts fairly and effectively. For the same reason, anything that would remove states or
private parties from the process, or diminish their roles, would not
only weaken enforcement and reduce deterrence, but would erode
the self-enforcement impetus that comes from wider understanding
and support for open, competitive markets.
It may be that some of the relevant engineering specialties are
developing a niche for forensic analysts who come to court with wellworn commitments. As yet, I have not seen evidence of this. In antitrust, this phenomenon has been experienced already with industrial
organization experts. But that has not foreclosed effective litigation.
I have yet to hear of an antitrust litigator incapable of finding a competent forensic economist able to carry the testimonial weight of the
case. The time is probably past when lawyers were the only advocates participating in antitrust cases. But so long as the alternative
ways of viewing the implications of a phenomenon-whether economic or scientific-are effectively presented to judge or jury by expert witnesses who have formed, express, and explain their opinions,
and so long as the trier of fact is attentive to its task, the litigation
process can bear these burdens. Often strained, occasionally overwhelmed, it has never been rendered incompetent by complexity.
3. Does Delay from Cumbersome ProcedureUnduly Inhibit Effective
New Economy Antitrust Enforcement?
Concern about the extent to which dynamism in the new
economy will outdistance enforcement efforts is more serious; it
invites confession and avoidance. Of course the demands of thorough, deliberative process cannot be accelerated to match Moore's
"law of productive technology." That is no reason to give up on
the law that enforces competition; it, by consensus, is good for the
economy, and many know it to enrich and sustain American cul-
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ture. Remember, ponderous responses to complex developments
in structure, conduct, or performance are not limited to new economy markets, though features special to such markets can intensify
the problems. Unexpected dynamism marked several earlier eras:
when the great trusts arose, before and during both world wars,
and in each of the several periods when the volume of mergers was
high enough to be referred to as a "wave." (Does anyone recall a
static, quiet time?) At all times of change enforcement is burdened
and delayed. But courts, enforcers, and the bar generally have
found ways to respond, as the "big case" literature over the decades suggests. 20 Indeed, while the new technologies complicate
big case issues, these very technologies can aid in managing the
resulting complexity. 21 One need do no more than compare the
skill and control with which the Microsoft case 22 was managed
with the manner in which the earlier IBM litigation 23 was handled
to dramatize that progress has been made.
Indeed, the most instructive indicator of whether technological complexity is overwhelming new economy antitrust is the enforcement record itself. There have been some high profile cases
involving Microsoft, Intel, and the World.Com/Sprint and
20 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979).
21 See generally Donald L KIawiter & Thomas J. Lang, Simplifying

Complex Litigation:
The Application of InternetTechnologies to AntitrustLitigation, 15 ANTITRUST 88 (2001).
22 For the district court findings see United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 1999). For the court's conclusions see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2000). For the court's final judgment see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000). The unanimous, en banc per curium court of appeals decision,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17137 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2001), cert. denied,No. 01-236, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9509 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 2001), upholds liability for section 2 of the Sherman Act for abusing monopoly power in
the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems, reverses section 2 liability for attempting
to monopolize the browser market (because the government failed to define that market), reverses application of the per se rule to find a tying violation adversely affecting the browser
market and remands for a rule of reason hearing. The decision also disqualifies the district court
judge for misconduct, vacates the divestiture order and directs reconsideration of the remedy on
remand, and specifically affirms the district court's 412 detailed findings of fact, all of which
remain binding on all remand issues. This fast track decision, coming scarcely three years after
the filing of the complaint, provides a solid foundation for settlement or, if that remains elusive,
a lucid road map for party presentations and trial court deliberations that should resolve the open
issues with dispatch and lead to a decree restoring effective competition. For the panel decision
by the court of appeals in the earlier consent decree contempt proceeding, which was permissive
of technical tying, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1998), affd,
165 F.3d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
23 In the government's monopolization case against IBM, the district
court weakly managed pretrial proceedings, particularly discovery. This led to delay, confusion and an inordinately large record. The case was dismissed by the United States on the eve of trial. See, e.g.,
FRANKLIN M. FISHER, FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED (1983).
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AOL/Time Warner mergers. These and other cases can be evaluated both from the implicit Posner standard-economically rational correction of market distortions-and from the broader conception incorporating also the interaction of enforcement with entrepreneurial culture.2 4 Let me first address the high profile cases,
then summarize enforcement in the fields Judge Posner identified
as troublesome, and in related areas where complex interactions
between antitrust and intellectual property have occurred.
United States v. Microsoft Corp.:25 The Intel-based PC operating system market requires high investment in developing IP and
is marked by strong network effects. In such a market, when proprietary software becomes a standard, the firm controlling it will
inevitably enjoy a period of power. Antitrust has two significant
tasks: to monitor the contest to become the standard, and to inhibit
the winner either from stifling such continuing dynamism as might
eventually unseat it or from leveraging its power into other markets. Both objectives confronted the IP-antitrust interface with
daunting, previously unresolved issues. One of the distinct successes of the government's monopolization case against Microsoft
is that it raised in sharp, understandable ways important issues
pertaining to the period after power is gained. Assume, as in Microsoft, that standard status is gained lawfully. When the dominant firm, protected by its IP and network effects, fears that innovative rivals in adjacent markets may erode power, may it respond
through technical tying? Software give-aways? Bundling transactions and other exclusives with hardware manufacturers? Licensing practices that limit competitive access to distribution channels?
While the full court of appeals opinion properly excoriated Judge
Jackson's extra judicial comments and reversed his rejection of a
remedy hearing, study of his meticulous findings 26 convinced that
court (along with most observers): (1) that the defendant holds a
dominant, well-entrenched share of a well-defined market, and (2)
that by irreversibly integrating previously separate software functionalities, and using an array of other exclusionary tactics that
could increase monopoly profits without offsetting efficiency
benefits, Microsoft unlawfully protected that power from market
forces. Equally importantly, given the district court role, Judge

24

See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17137
(D.C. Cir.
Aug. 2,2001), cert. denied, No. 01-236, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9509 (Oct. 9, 2001).
26 See Microsoft, 65 F.
Supp. 2d at 1.
25

2001]

COMPETITION POLICY IN HIGH TECH MARKETS

Jackson's rulings2 7 served up the issues lucidly and in full context
for appellate review. Moreover, the court of appeals fully understood them, analyzed them thoroughly, applied conventional doctrine in plausible ways, and lucidly explained every step of its
analysis.
The court's unanimous, full bench per curiam opinion is particularly impressive in its treatment of monopoly maintenance.
The court invokes complex, post-Chicago analysis of intricate
facts to reach and explicate an eminently sound result. This is the
most instructive and doctrinally important part of the opinion.
Reversal of the attempt to monopolize claim for failure to define
the browser market, by contrast, seems something of a technicality
and partially inconsistent with the court's own monopoly maintenance analysis. Regarding market definition, browsers were
shown to be a distinct, new category of software with its own demand and with, at the time, only two discernible participants.
Shouldn't that be enough? As to consistency, the monopolization
liability was predicated in substantial part on conduct shown to
injure Microsoft's browser competitor. Unless the court intended
to imply that conduct affecting two markets may be evaluated only
in respect of one of the two-a distinctly untenable position-the
views expressed about attempted monopolization are at odds with
those adopted for monopolization. The court's revision of the tying doctrine, a move the Supreme Court has expressly declined
(though admittedly in a different context), also is provocative. The
district court, applying the Supreme Court's analytically enhanced
per se rule, held that, by integrating Microsoft Explorer into Windows, Microsoft not only violated section 2 of the Sherman Act
(by protecting its Windows monopoly), but also violated section 1
by stifling consumer choice in the browser market. Concluding
that the separate demand test incorporated into this per se rule is
only a limited proxy for overall efficiency of newly integrated
software, the court remanded for a rule of reason analysis of harms
and benefits. Accepting that the presumptions built into the Supreme Court rule may (like any presumption) miss some things a
full analysis might disclose, should such a revision of Supreme
Court doctrine come from a court of appeals-indeed, in a context
where the conduct in question has already been found violative of
section 2 for its adverse impact in a directly related market? Yet,
the more significant facet of this holding is what the court declined
to do. Relying on language from the same court's panel opinion in
27

See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
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the earlier consent decree contempt proceeding that seemed to
support such an argument, Microsoft contended that any integration into any software of any previously separate functionalities
would be per se lawful. The court first rejected this claim when it
ruled that irreversibly integrating Explorer into Windows violated
section 2. It did so again when it remanded the government's tying charge for a fuller efficiency analysis. Given that Microsoft
plans to integrate other additional functionalities into its forthcoming new version of Windows, this holding, along with the affirmance of all of the district court findings, could have profound
significance when "fencing in" provisions are being fashioned at
the remedy phase on remand.
The questions the case raises are now an important element
in the policy debate not only here but in the European Union.2 8
Regardless of how the balance is finally struck on the remand issues, Microsoft models effective enforcement and highlights the
importance of not giving up on evaluation of competitive strategies
in dominated new economy markets. Doing this is difficult. It can
be done fully only by weighing any efficiency justification for the
strategies (including any claim that they are no more than a reasonable reward for the innovative investment that yielded the IP
that became the standard) against any ex post consumer injury,
including harm to research and development ("R&D") competition. As in Microsoft, courts may seldom resolve all issues in an
ideal way; debate about them should persist. Antitrust is, after all,
a living tradition. Doctrinal development is never a triumphant
march. It has its starts, stumbles, detours, and periods of ferment.
But so long as the courts adhere to core commitments, and remain
open to relevant information and analysis, progress will be made.
In these respects, the court of appeals decision in Microsoft exemplifies much of what is best in the antitrust tradition. It has a
gravitas commensurate with the status of the firm and the importance of the issues. It serves both economic rationality and the
homiletic tradition well.
In re Intel Corp.:29 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
Alexander Schaub, Director, European Commission, participated
in the Round Table
Conference with Enforcement Officials, 49d' Annual Spring Meeting, ABA Antitrust Section,
March 30, 2001, Washington, D.C. He and the U.S. enforcement officials emphasized policy
convergence and cooperation and the tenor of remarks during the question period suggested that
EU antitrust enforcement will continue to significantly affect U.S. firms in international markets.
29 FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (August 3, 1999)
(decision and order), available at
http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/1999/9908/intel.do.htm. See also Pitofsky Remarks, supranote 1 ("Mhe
order in Intel is the prime example of the effort by the FTC to pursue conventional antitrust
28
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charged Intel with monopolizing the general-purpose microprocessor market by selectively withholding information from customers
to force them to assign or to withhold enforcement of their own
IP. 30 This tactic was allegedly used against a workstation manufacturer to force assignment of potentially competitive microprocessor patents and against a PC manufacturer to force withdrawal of
a claim that Intel infringed a patent this customer held. In both
instances patent barriers to Intel's dominated market would be
raised by the conduct. In the third alleged incident the tactic was
used against a PC manufacturer to deter it from enforcing its PC
patent against other PC manufacturers using Intel chips. 31 As the
FTC saw it, the purpose was to stop the target firm from appropriating value based on information in the stream between Intel and
its PC customers, an appropriation that might reduce Intel's share.
In all three instances, the alleged investment in innovation by Intel's customers and potential competitors would be discouraged.
The facts were complex and the legal issues novel. They
could be processed well only by an agency or court open to exploring all relevant information and analysis. 32 Intel, like Microsoft,
was competently managed by both parties and disposed of with
dispatch. On the face of it, the consent relief obtained-that Intel
not deny information to any customer not seeking an injunction
against Intel's marketing of its own products 3 3-represents a balanced resolution of the issues and successful new economy enforcement. On the one hand, the conduct forbidden could discourage R&D investment thus positioning Intel as an innovation gatekeeper. 34 It could also raise barriers to the dominated market.35

enforcement, while at the same time tailoring its complaint and order so as not to undermine
incentives to innovate in the first place.").
30 See FIC Dkt. No. 9288 3,
11 (June 8, 1998) (complaint), available at
http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/1998/98061intelcmp.pdf.
31 See FTC Dkt. No. 9288 6-7, Hl 28-29, available at http'J/www.fte.gov/os/1998/
9806/intelcmp.pdf.
32 Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) in
which the five to four majority affirmed the obligation and capacity of antitrust courts to process
market information in a post-Chicago analysis about how particular markets work. See the
discussion in Steven C. Salop, The FirstPrinciplesApproach to Antitrust, Kodak, andAntitrust
at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.. 187, 187 (2000) (commending the Kodak court for expertly applying "the basic principles of competitive analysis to a difficult dynamic context").
FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (August 3, 1999) (decision and order),
available at
http:/www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9908rmtel.do.htm.
See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the
Antitrust Agencies?, The Intellectual Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANtiTRUST Li. 43, 66 (2001) (discussing In re Intel Corp.).
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On the other, Intel's defenses-primarily that it could not significantly diminish R&D competition in any market and had often
supported innovation by customers-would, to the extent proved,
have weakened the FTC's affirmative case, but without putting
much on the efficient business justification side of the scale.3 6 It is
not plausible that allowing Intel to grasp broad control of innovation in its own and related markets is no more than a reasonable
reward for Intel's own innovation. Certainly the expectation of
being able to gain such control would not be needed, ex ante, to
encourage the kind of innovation that Intel successfully did. The
consent settlement, which allows Intel to refuse to deal when confronted by an IP claimant seeking to enjoin Intel sales, is an ample
response to concerns about fairness to a firm whose IP is challenged.
World. Com/Sprint Merger: Mergers and joint ventures are
frequent in the new economy and their size and complexity has
challenged the agencies. Nevertheless, enforcement, if not routine,
has been significant and apparently successful. The Department of
Justice ("DOJ") has challenged several mergers in the converging
telecommunications industries.37 The WorldCom/Sprint merger, in
particular, was highly visible, thus having a homiletic effect. But
most importantly it was thoroughly sound antitrust. The merger, if
consummated, would have densely concentrated domestic and international long distance, Internet backbone and data network
markets. Faced with the challenge, the parties abandoned it in
2000.38
Other significant matters include the DOJ challenge to the
Borland/Ashton-Tate merger, which effectively opened important
IP assets.39 So, too, the FTC proceeding against Dell Computer
for deceptively manipulating cooperative standard setting.4 0 Like
DOJ's challenge to Borland/Ashton-Tate, this case impeded com-

35

See id. at 67.

36 See id. at
68.

Ten such mergers were challenged by DOJ between October 1997
and December 2000.
See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Challenges in Telecommunications Markets, Oct. 1997
- Dec. 2000, in Committee Program Material, ABA 49h Annual Spring Conference, ABA
Antitrust Section (March 30,2001), Vol. 1, Tab 4, at 105.
37

38

See id.

United States v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69, 774
(N.D. Cal.
1992) (final judgment). See Fazio & Stem, supra note 5, at 45 (exploring the types of enforcement options that are effective in preserving competition and the incentives for innovation and
evaluating the remedy imposed by the DOJ in Borland).
40 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C.
616 (1996).
39
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petitively risky conduct and gained significant relief in the form of
opening IP rights.
AOL/Time Warner: This massive merger was challenged by
the FTC but ultimately approved subject to consent relief that requires Time Warner to open its cable system to competing Internet
services providers ("ISPs").41 While this relief can be evaluated,42
the outcome as a whole is difficult to evaluate with publicly available information. For that reason alone one cannot cite it as effective homiletically. Indeed, much of the news reportage might have
invited the inference that this integration of two media monoliths
should have been stopped. Whether this merger would pass muster
under a rigorous post-Chicago analysis such43 as that modeled by
Riordan and Salop remains an open question.
Enforcement in Other IP Intensive Markets: Antitrust enforcement in other new economy markets 44 and in related areas of

technological complexity where IP is significant 45 also supports
the conclusion that, taxed as the agencies are, the antitrust-IP interface is not being overpowered. When courts and agencies hew to
conventional antitrust doctrine, utilize all available analytical tools
and explore the particulars of complex markets, 4 6 effective enforcement can be achieved.
This brief summary of recent and ongoing enforcement suggests little reason for pessimism about the institutional capacity of
antitrust to cope with the new economy. Antitrust always has been
41

See America Online and Time Warner Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-3989 (Dec. 14, 2000),

available at http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/12index.htm.
42 See discussion infra
Part Ill.B.2.
43 See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating
Vertical Mergers: A PostChicago Approach, 63 ANTrIRusT L.J. 513, 519-20 (1995) (arguing that vertical mergers may
pose a risk of raising rivals' costs, coordinated conduct, and price regulation evasion under a
post-Chicago analysis).
See, e.g., Gilbert & Tom, supra note 34, at 63 (discussing United States
v. Visa USA,
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7076 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998)).
45 See, e.g., id. at 53-60 (discussing the Glaxo/Wellcome, Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz,
and Lockheed-Martin/Northrop Grumman Mergers); id at 75-82 (discussing the FTC's reviews of drug
patent settlements, patent pooling, and patent fraud cases). See also David Balto & Robert
Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BuLL. 583,
584 (1998) ("The antitrust laws apply as equally to high-tech as other industries, but high-tech
industries impose some special challenges for antitrust enforcers due to a number of issues that
makes competition different from that observed in traditional 'smokestack' industries."); David
A. Balto, PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.. 321
(2000) (discussing the critical role of antitrust enforcement in pharmaceutical markets).
46 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992), where
the majority opinion keeps antitrust analysis open to evaluation of the competitive effects of
particularized market information. See also Salop, supra note 32 (analyzing Kodak from the
first principles approach to antitrust analysis which focuses on the competitive effects of the
conduct at issue).
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and remains a process that transforms itself as the economy changes
and the broader culture's demands upon and standards for the economy develop. Successes are achieved. Mistakes are made, too.
Learning goes on. None of this provides reason to throw up one's
hands as the Posner paper may seem to imply. Indeed, by his service
in Microsoft, Judge Posner, himself, has modeled how those interested in competition should respond: Commit to finding sensible
resolutions within the confines of the substantive law and procedural
system, and then do the earnest, thoughtful work that this requires.
Judge Posner's service as a mediator contributed very effectively to
antitrust enforcement in the new economy. Under his tutelage the
parties came very close to settlement, hardly an experience that suggests the case was unmanageable. But frustrating as the failure to
close the case may have been, Judge Posner's participation, under the
scrutiny of the media, enhanced the important homiletic contribution
the case is still making to antitrust enforcement.
Finally, note that the delay and complexity associated with
new economy litigation is not the special preserve of antitrust.
The digital environment of e-commerce is marked by developments demanding new jurisdictional, contractual, and transactional
governance arrangements, motivating novel techniques for appropriating information, defying conventional legal solutions, and
confronting litigators and judges with burdensome information
issues. For example, gaining IP protection and contesting claims
can be frustratingly slow in a world where the United States Patent
and Trade Mark Office's ("PTO") know-how is not up to speed,
policy is developing only slowly, and courts may be ill at ease
with the technical issues. Indeed, just as a market may have
changed by the time the need for an antitrust remedy is established, so the benefits of hard-won IP protection may be obsolete
by the time a patent is even granted or a software copyright found
to have been infringed.47
B. ParticularizedMarket Information and Openness to Empirically Based Analysis by Agencies and Courts
During the 1950s and 1960s, courts dealing with patentantitrust issues seemed more sensitive to the antitrust dangers,
which they had doctrinal and some analytical tools to evaluate,
than to the benefits of patent-generated innovation, which they
See LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 323-26 (discussing the marginal benefits
to society from
software patents as well as their detrimental effect on writing software programs).
47
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could not quantify.48 Beginning in the 1970s, things began to
change. During the 1980s, the elegant certainties of Chicago
school economics were absorbed by courts. 49 Markets, even quite
concentrated ones, were seen as robust and contestable, market
failures largely self-correcting and antitrust interventions risky,
sometimes defective, and even self-defeating. While Chicago hegemony gave way in the 1990s to post-Chicago thinking, 50 judges
with Chicago training and instincts remain, even today, a significant, at times a dominant, force. Moreover, the 1980s and even
more so the 1990s have given rise to a new disposition relevant to
the IP-antitrust relationship. Courts, like much of the rest of the
nation, have come to value R&D immensely. For this reason,
when IP and antitrust appear to push against each other, the ex ante
benefits of innovative investment may be over valued. Nevertheless, if one could assume that the relevant IP law was a basically
sound response to the public goods market failure associated with
information-an assumption discussed in Part II of this paperthere would be no need for excessive pessimism about new economy competition based on the way IP and antitrust interrelate.
There would be issues, of course. And if these were resolved by
an intemperate commitment to the classical models and parsimony
about evidence distinguishing particular markets from traditional
models, the resulting simplifications might screen out significant
antitrust concerns. But that need not happen. It will be difficult to
integrate IP and antitrust in new economy markets so as to maximize welfare. Achieving this will present problems of administration sufficient to strain judicial capacity. Yet, if timid "per se lawful" rules and overly cautions presumptions are avoided, it can be
done. New economy markets are highly varied, but seldom idiosyncratic. IP costs are heavily front-loaded and network effects
frequent. Because of this, new economy markets cannot be adequately understood through overarching price theory alone. Still,
varied as these markets are, they do display recurring phenomena.
With sufficient empirical information and both conventional price
theory and post-Chicago insights, these markets can be understood.
Judicial process, as well as antitrust theory, can be supple enough
48

See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §181, at 520 (1977) (evaluating

patent enforcement policy as exclusionary conduct).
49

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTTRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION

AND ITS PRACTICE, §§ 2.2b-2.2e, at 60-70 (lst ed. 1994) (describing the Chicago school antitrust analysis, its influence in major antitrust cases, and the rise of post-Chicago analysis).
50 See id. § 2.2e, at 68-70 (describing post-Chicago theories
as more complex and ambiguous than Chicago orthodoxy).
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to manage the complexities with reasonable success. 5 1
Regarding openness to particularized analysis, an unpublished paper by Professor Hovenkamp invites comment. 52 It recognizes that post-Chicago analysis has shown that some market
structures and some types of collaboration are more likely to have
anticompetitive consequences than are supposed by the assumptions of Chicago price theory; therefore, that Chicago orthodoxy
may not be the best and certainly is not the only analytical tool for
understanding markets that do not fit classical models.53 Yet, the
paper speculates that post-Chicago thinking may be deficient because it does not yield testable propositions transposable into antitrust rules. For this reason it surmises that rules based on Chicago
thinking may be appropriate. But linking antitrust to the new
economy is not a rule-making task. Antitrust already has its substantive rules. They are settled, widely accepted and in modest
need of refreshment. Except in the ever-narrowing field where per
se responses are called for, these rules make outcomes turn on
purpose and effect. 54 And the implication-that Chicago price
theory yields testable conclusions while post-Chicago theory does
not-is simply wrong. Chicago outcomes are "validated" only in
the sense that if all of their underlying assumptions are factually
correct, the outcome is inevitable. But that is a far cry from saying
that Chicago theory has an empirical base. Bork, indeed, insisted
that "antitrust must avoid any standards that require direct measurement and quantification of either restrictions on output or efficiency. ' ,55 Post-Chicago thinking, by contrast, while it, too, ends
51 See M. Sean Royall, Editor's Note, Post-Chicago
Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445,
454 (1995) (stating that "most post-Chicago criticisms call for refinements to-not rejection
of-Chicago School approaches").
52 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
53 The Hovenkamp paper cites ROGER D. BLAIR
& DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983) (discussing vertical integration
where input proportions can be varied); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. REV. 2239 (2000) (discussing strategic pricing above
cost); Michael A. Solinger, Vertical Mergers anzd Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345
(1988) (arguing that vertical mergers can, in some cases, raise the price of the final product);
Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity In Netvork Industries,7 GEo.MASON L.REV. 673 (1999) (discussing
network externalities); Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and
Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982) (finding the "[o]verall welfare effect of vertical integration is
very unlikely to be beneficial as long as the elasticity of substitution remains fairly low, though
prices will often rise"); Hovenkamp, supra note 52, at 3 (arguing that "markets can in fact be
anticompetitive over a variety of circumstances that Chicago economists generally disallowed").
54

See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES,
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN

INTEGRATED HANDBOOK, § 5.3f, at 204-18 (2000) (describing the modem synthesis of per se
and rule of reason analysis).
55 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 117
(1978). See also PERrrz,supra note
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with a deductive analysis, first tests and corrects relevant price
theory assumptions on the basis of an empirical investigation of
the particular market. The task of post-Chicago thinking is not to
fashion new rules. It is precisely in applying the well established
general rules of antitrust that post-Chicago thinking shows a potency that strict, ideological Chicago thinking may lack.
Of course, there need not and should not be a war between
Chicago and post-Chicago analysis. The questions always are
whether a particular market fits the precise assumptions to which
an analysis addresses itself and, if not, in what particulars does it
vary and can the effects of the variations be analyzed and understood. For example, even committed Chicagoans would not likely
assert today that a conventional model about contestable markets
could be applied to an information-centered market where a proprietary standard and network effects protected a first entrants'
market share lead.56 It is post-Chicago thinkers that have made
theory about network effects accessible. 57 But they claim no patent on recognition that marginal cost pricing probably cannot be
sustained in IP-centric markets strongly affected by such externalities. That insight is now in the public domain.
The question, in sum, is not whether rules should be rewritten in post-Chicago terms, but whether fact-finders should be
given access to all relevant information and credible analysis about
why given conduct in a given setting may or may not do competitive harm. To limit inquiry to Chicago orthodoxy even though it
has recognized limits, especially when applied to new economy
markets, gains simplicity at appalling cost. True, there are some
mid-level rules or presumptions where Chicago thinking could
narrow the range of issues to be presented to the trier of fact. But
if the choice is between committing to more or less self executing
rules-like, for example, the Areeda-Turner rule on predatory pricing 5 -- known to produce theoretically identifiable false negatives5 9-0r letting triers of fact hear the data and process alterna11, at 258-60 (criticizing Chicago analysis).
56 See, e.g., PosnerArticle, supra note 1, at 926-29 (contrasting doctrines developed to
deal with antitrust in smokestack industries with those needed to regulate the new economy).
See also authority cited supranote 51.
57 See the authorities cited supra
note 5.
58 See Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related
PracticesUnder
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
59 See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 53, at 2250-51 (noting that after the Areeda-Turner
Rule
was implemented, the success of plaintiffs fell drastically); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current
State of the Lav and Economics of PredatoryPricing, 83 AM. ECON. Rnv. 162, 166 (1993)
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tive analyses by conflicting experts, I see no basis either for a conviction or an intuition that closing off the possibility of avoiding
false negatives is the more prudent course.
Tying, the most technologically complex issue in Microsoft,
illustrates the importance of not closing off information. In the
1998 contempt case, the circuit court panel opinion can be read to
suggest a per se rule that technical tying (integrating the functionality of one information product into a separate, dominant IP protected information product) cannot violate the Sherman Act, regardless of whether there are two product markets as conventionally defined, the integration transports monopoly power from the
first market to the second, and the product being integrated into the
dominant one is a partial or potential substitute that, were its mar6
ket left open, might have tamed the dominant firm's power. 0
So urgent a resistance to difficult case management impairs
basic tenets of antitrust and competitive theory and strains against
the implication of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,61 the Supreme Court's latest tying case. If Judge Jackson's findings in Microsoft did nothing else they showed that issues like the one so eschewed by the 1998 court of appeals panel
are judicially manageable. His findings about protecting operating
system power and threatening to gain power in browsers by integrating browser functionality into Windows, are lucid, balanced,
and supported by evidence. They clearly show that for strategic
reasons Microsoft opted to stop offering its software without an
integrated browser, although it could have offered both an integrated and an unintegrated alternative. As the court of appeals'
unanimous en banc 2001 decision recognized, whether such findings warrant concluding that the Sherman Act was violated ought
not to be based on misgivings about complexity, or disdain for the
capacity of district courts, but on weighing the welfare effects of
the alternative courses which Microsoft could have chosen.
In new economy markets such balancing will often be complex. Not only do these markets differ from old economy markets,

(special edition) ("If substantial informational asymmetries constitute an important prerequisite
for rational predation, then it would seem essential that any 'test' for predation include an assessment of the information characteristics of the market in which it is alleged their predation
occurred.").

60 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1998), affd, 165 F.3d
952 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
61 504 U.S. 451 (1984). See also Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (finding no tying arrangement between anesthesiology and hospital services).
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they also differ considerably inter se. Though most of the special
features noted in Part L.A62 may appear in most of these markets,
they are likely to present themselves in different mixes and to
stimulate a variety of different strategies for exploiting the IP:
Price and other tactics to gain an early lead that network effects
may expand and switching costs protect; tying; inhibiting interoperability; inter-generational strategies, and so forth.
The first question, of course, is whether the IP proprietor by
strategic use of the IP is reducing consumer welfare ex postwhether, in short, the tactic being used raises consumer prices,
reduces the value of the output product or service, or inhibits
R&D. If no such ex post harm is apparent, the IP proprietor cannot be violating the Sherman Act, even if it has monopoly power.
If consumers are adversely affected, the inquiry proceeds to
whether the tactic is defensible because allowing it is within the
reasonable reward for the investment yielding the IP. To assure a
policy-centric integration of IP and antitrust, the answer should
turn on whether the expectation of being able to exploit the IP in
the way under challenge would be reasonably anticipated as one of
the incentives for making the ex ante investment that led to the IP.
Hypotheticals can illustrate this line.
First, assume X Co. reconfigures computers and installs application programs for specialized functions in the widget industry. It
has monopoly power in this niche market because its computers and
the software have become standards. X also provides service and
originally dominated this aftermarket, too. However, independent
service providers ("ISPs") have entered, undercut X's prices and
gained significant share. X responds by developing diagnostic software, which it refuses to license to service competitors. X successfully reduces its service costs and prices and regains share. It seems
fairly obvious that the hope of that outcome is what generated X's
innovative investment. Were X charged with monopolization, a
quick-look conclusion of no violation would be warranted.
Now add to the hypothetical: After the above event, an outside company designs equally efficient diagnostic software and
licenses the ISPs. X responds by developing and migrating its
customers to a new generation upgraded application package, and
licenses this to widget firms only if they will agree to a long-term
contract for hardware and software service. If the tactic reinstates
X's downstream monopoly, the resulting competitive harm-the
service monopoly-would be evident. It would also be evident
62

See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
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that it was achieved by tying. If the current truncated per se rule
survives (and if consumer choice is highly valued, it should) that
would end the inquiry.6 3 But consider the matter under the rule of
reason that the Microsoft court of appeals' decision required. The
analysis might be complex. No doubt downstream competition is
one of the things that spurred X to move to a new generation product. But was the 'expectation of being able to tie in service a significant motivation for developing the application package? If so,
does the welfare benefit from that new package outweigh the loss
attributable to the reinstated service monopoly? In a lean hypothetical such questions may seem intractable. However, they are
of no different order than the kinds of balancing that courts must
regularly undertake to apply the rule of reason. Evidence could be
gathered, evaluated and weighed. It is a difficult, but manageable
task.
II. DOES EXCESSIVE IP PROTECTION CAUSE ALLOCATIVE
DISTORTION AND REDUCE CONSUMER WELFARE IN THE NEW
ECONOMY?

The goal of IP, to correct "free rider" market failures that
keep investment in innovation below optimum levels, is economically rational. Yet, that overprotective IP can distort allocation,
hurt consumers and impede further innovation, is wisdom long in
the public domain. 64 That major IP regimes sometimes do excessively protect is also sadly familiar. 65 Both observations have
fresh significance, moreover, because the new economy is built on
information and its participants, often debarred from marginal cost
pricing, rely heavily on IP-linked competitive strategies and network effects. In consequence, any harm from excessive IP protection is amplified. For this reason, those who value effective competition must take seriously the task of understanding and evaluating the actual allocative and consumer welfare results of the IP
system. This is imperative because, unlike antitrust, IP is anything
but supple. Its "one size fits all" rules leave courts painfully little
discretion to weigh costs and benefits before applying them.
63

See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 54, at § 7.2d, at 414-15 (applying the modified

per se rule or structured rule of reason to tie-ins and noting that an aftermarket may be a separate market for purposes of the second prong of the rule).
64 See id. § 15.2a., at
809-12.
65 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial for rehearing en banc) ("Overprotecting intellectual
property is as harmful as underprotecting it .... Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed
fire, is genuinely new .... ).
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A. PatentLaw
The greatest risk that excessive patent protection unduly impedes new economy competition is shared with all segments of the
economy where substantial corporate R&D is common. Efficient
allocation, consumer welfare, and even dynamic efficiency are
imperiled if the patent system is hemorrhaging and needs to be
staunched. And it may well be. Not only are applications, grants
and the rate of grants per dollar of R&D all at towering heights,
but the percentage of grants on corporate applications may be approaching 100%.66 When applicants in R&D-centric industries
face PTO resistance they can bring sufficient technological resources to bear in the ex parte proceeding to overwhelm the examiner with information, expertise, argument and docket delay. 67 My
purpose is not to select among the many mitigations that have been
suggested,68 but to insist that anyone who values free markets
should be concerned. The patent system should not be allowed to
deteriorate into a regulatory regime that doles out exclusive licenses for myriad ideas, technologies, algorithms, and business
methods without adequate policing for novelty or non-obviousness
and then cloaks the grants with presumed validity when they are
challenged. Whether by greater resources for training of, and
higher standards for, examiners, the repeal of the presumption of
validity, switching to a straightforward registration system, or by
other means, the current system can and should be improved. If it
is not, gratuitous rewards in excess of those needed to encourage
innovation may distort allocation, reduce consumer welfare, and
impede innovation by closing off research paths too early, too
broadly, or on the basis of too trivial a contribution. In Parts
II.A.1. and H.A.2., following, particular areas of patent law where
over protection may threaten new economy competition are explored.
See discussion in James Langenfeld, Intellectual Propertyand Antitrust: Steps
Toward
Striking a Balance,52 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 91 (2001).
67 See Flavio Rose, Patent Truths, LA. LAw., OcL 2001,
at 40, 40 (arguing that patents
have become easier to obtain in part because PTO "examiners have become increasingly overworked and susceptible to strategies that exploit their overload").
6S See, e.g., LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 333-34
(discussing problems related to obviousness and computer-implemented inventions); Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: ProprietaryRightsfor Business Concepts and PatentSystem Reform,
14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 557 (1999) (advancing patent system reforms such as restructuring
jobs and incentives in the patent office and obtaining information from the requesting firm's
competitors); Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 1 (suggesting the need to strike a balance between
intellectual property and antitrust).
66
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1. ProprietaryControl of Software Algorithms
The debate about computer software as patentable subject
matter, long a contentious area, appears to be over. The court in
Gottschalk v. Benson69 denied 35 U.S.C. § 10170 patent coverage to
software because the applicant's claim comprehended a generalized formulation for programs to solve the mathematical problem
of converting one form of notation into a form easier for a computer to comprehend. 7 1 The Douglas opinion resonated with earlier doctrine that excluded patentability of mathematical formulae,
methods of calculation, and so-called mental steps. So doing, it
was also consistent with two propositions often encountered in
discussion about patents, the pragmatic conviction that no patents
should be so broad as to preempt unforeseen technologies, and the
basic value stance that patents should not be granted on ways of
thinking.
The second of these propositions-the value-based concept-was reinforced in 1978 in Parker v. Flook.72 Section 101
coverage was denied to a method for updating alarm limits for
catalytic conversions in three steps: measuring the operating conditions, using a mathematical calculation to update the limit, and
adjusting the alarm to the updated value.7 3 Four years later in
Diamond v. Diehr,74 the last Supreme Court case to address patentability of software, the pragmatic theme behind Benson was
further advanced, but with a different outcome. For the first time
the Court upheld as § 101 subject matter a computer related process claim that used a mathematical algorithm. 75 But this process,
well-embedded in the technical fatherland of patents, affected a
tangible, transformation of physical material in a specified technological field, thus not fully appropriating the algorithm. Then followed a period when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("CCPA") would evaluate computer related claims by a two-step
procedure. First, is a mathematical algorithm recited directly or
409 U.S. 63 (1972). The most salient issues concerning patent protection of
software
are more fully explored in LEMLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3. I have drawn on the insights of
these authors.
70 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
71 See Gottschalk, 409
U.S. at 65.
72 437 U.S. 584
(1978).
73 See id. at
585-86.
74 450 U.S. 175
(1981).
75 See id. at
184-85.
69
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indirectly? Second, if so, is the claimed invention no more than
the algorithm itself, or is the algorithm applied to and limited by
physical elements or process steps.7 6
A development from that tradition occurred in 1994 when
the Federal Circuit decided In re Alappat.77 The invention there
dealt with displayed data in waveform on an oscilloscope (the
'front of a cathode-ray tube (CRT)). 78 The problem addressed was
that, because of the limited number of pixels on a CRT screen,
rising and falling portions of the wave appeared discontinuous.
Through software, the invention modulated the illumination intensity of the pixels, thus eliminating the discontinuity. The Board
rejected the claim as falling within the "mathematical algorithm
exception" to patentable subject matter. 79 The Federal Circuit reversed. In Benson, Flook and Diehr, it found no such exception,
but only three limits to patentable subject matter: laws of nature,
natural phenomena and abstract ideas.80 The three Supreme Court
cases were viewed as saying no more than that certain mathematical subject matter, "standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas."'', To evaluate whether a software claim fails for
that reason, the court must "see whether the claimed subject matter
as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept . . . which in
essence represents nothing more than a 'law of nature.' 8 2 Only if
so does Diehr exclude it as patentable subject matter. The majority recognized that the elements in the claim mathematically transformed one set of data to another, but construed the claim as limited to the particular transformation, one which altered something
physical-a wave on a screen from a discontinuous image to a
smooth one. The substantive thrust of Alappat was that, when the
software claimed was embedded in a structure, it became patentable subject matter. Its practical effect was to open the floodgates to software related patent applications.
While Alappat might have left the inference that something
physical, perhaps even technological, still had to be involved to
bring software within patentable subject matter, after the Federal
76

See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed.

Cir. 1992) (reciting the history of this so-called Freedman-Walter-Abele test and applying it to a
claim directed to a procedure for determining when heart attack victims are at high risk).
77 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
78 Id. at 1537.
79 Id. at 1539.

90 Id.at 1542-43.
81 1& at 1543.
82 Id.at 1544.
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Circuit decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,83 such limiting references are no longer warranted. It is now clear that any programmed hardware and that
any process involving software is patentable subject matter, so84
long as it can achieve a "useful, concrete, and tangible" result.
Indeed, State Street Bank, which articulated this rather coarse
grained screen, accepted software that solved a complex financial
bookkeeping problem by transforming financial data inputs into a
current monetary value, hardly a "tangible" transformation in the
same sense as Diehr's change in the form of physical material or
even Alappat's change of the display on a cathode-ray screen.
While the non-obviousness test may yet remain a barrier, this new,
generous view of software patentability, embraced and extended
by the PTO, pushes against the policy that patent protection should
not be granted too far upstream, lest too broad a swath of exclusive
technological territory be ceded. Indeed, the PTO now regards
pure data structures as patentable subject matter, though it is hard
to find any basis for this view either in Diehr or the post-Diehr
CCPA or Federal Circuit case law.
This risk of patent protection effectively preempting broad
development areas and unduly inhibiting competitive innovation is
magnified for software because, as the Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.85 court recognized in the copyright context,
even a straightforward application program contains not one idea,
but many. Indeed, Robert Merges quotes Daniel Brecklin (who
designed one of the first spread sheet programs) as saying that "a
sophisticated application program may involve from . . . [10 to

10,000 separately] patentable processes. 86 Patents, remember, are
often issued long after the application date.
A program long in the market may ultimately be found to
contain one or more modules or sub-routines that infringe one or
more earlier invented but later granted patents. At the time of development the infringer may have had no practical way of avoiding
the risk.87 All of these effects, significant in themselves, may well
have a tendency to increase software concentration. Software
grows increasingly complex and expensive to produce as hardware
and semiconductor technology become more powerful and
83
84
85

149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1373 (quoting In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).

86 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 119 (2d ed. 1997).
87 See id. at

120.
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cheaper. As members of the large firm software oligopoly incur
the expense of expanding their patent portfolios, the numerous
fringe firms, still important in the industry, face a Hobson's
choice: either (1) divert limited resources from software design
into the patent chase or (2) frequently find innovation paths
blocked by portfolios accumulated by others. 88 Also, as more and
more algorithms are patented, even the transaction costs of clearing away impediments through licenses may develop into a significant barrier to entry and to effective software development,
especially by small firms. 89 Beyond that, as software becomes
more complex, more expensive to produce, and more the preserve
of large producers, the contention that protection beyond copyright
is needed to support innovative investment may weaken. First
entrant advantages, trade secret protections, non-competition
covenants in employment contracts, and strategies such as periodic
upgrades and even contractual protection against reverse engineering can be brought into play to appropriate informational assets. 90
If these are reinforced by network effects, they may be impermeable.
Interestingly enough, these developments-with their risks
to optimum allocation and effective competition in softwarehave occurred at about the same time that some (though not all)
excesses in copyright protection for software were being tamed.
Most particularly, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test of
Computer Associates9' diminishes greatly the risk of overprotection signaled by earlier cases like Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory,Inc.92 Additionally, Fiest Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,9 3 by establishing at least
minimum creativity as a constitutional prerequisite for protection
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, 9 4 and even Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc.,95 by emphasizing the significance of transforma-

88

See id. at 119-20.

89 For a collection of literature on IP licensing transaction costs, see LEMLEY,
supra note

13, at 323-24.
90 See generally SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 4, at 83-102 (discussing
the management
of information assets).
91 See ComputerAssocs., 982 F.2d at 706-12.
92 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (protecting non-literal elements of computer program

under copyright law).
93 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
94 See id. at
358.
95 510 U.S. 569
(1994).
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tive expression to the availability of the fair use defense, 96 signaled
other possibilities for narrowing copyright protection for software,
given that its technical nature weighs against its being particularly
expressive. As courts learned more about software, they recognized that wide IP protection could threaten rather than advance
the social interest in technological growth and development. Perhaps more experience with software patents will tend toward similar caution.97 In evaluating software patents there is, then, considerable heft on the negative side of the allocative efficiency and
consumer welfare scale. Nor is much benefit apparent that weighs
against this. As the Court noted in Benson,98 but ignored in
Diehr,99 not only do software authors already hold copyrights,
there is no dearth of innovative investment in software, nor was
there even before the ready availability of patent protection was
established.
2. ProprietaryControl of B2B and e-Commerce Business Methods
About the time it started freely granting software patents,
the PTO moved the patent system away from its traditional link to
technology in another, related area. It began to award computer
related business method patents. This administrative rejection of1a°
long assumed "business method exception" to § 101 coverage"
was also validated in State Street Bank.10 1 Since that decision, the
number of applications and PTO grants has accelerated. Not surprisingly, given the limited experience and resources of the PTO, a
96

See id. at581 n.14.
Ironically, the market effect of these positive changes in software
copyright case law
has been to increase the extent to which patent replaces copyright as the IP regime of choice for
software.
98
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (quoting from REPORT OF THE
97

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM (1966)). See also DONALD S. CHISUM,
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT §

1.03(6) (2001).
99 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 187-90 (1981).
100 See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908)
(noting
that methods of doing business are abstract ideas).
101 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). The patent in State Street Bank was not the first computer related business method
patent to be upheld by a court.

In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smight, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Del. 1983), the court rejected a
challenge to Merrill Lynch's broad financial product claim for a Securities Brokerage-Cash
Management System noting that no procedure for solving a mathematical problem was claimed.
A PTO spokeswoman was recently reported to have said that only about sixty percent of business method applications are granted, a statistic she apparently thought should reduce concern
about overprotection. See William M. Bulkeley, A Billion-DollarPatent?,WALL ST. J., August
28, 2000, at B 1.
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number of the recently granted business method patents seem aweThe
somely broad and, hence, dangerously anticompetitive.
Signature Financial patent, upheld in State Street Bank, could be
but one example of a spate of patents that may effectively accord
patent control to each step in the on-going process of innovation in
investment products and hedging and speculation products such as
financial instruments and derivatives. Indeed, the PTO's open
floodgates approach currently in vogue goes well beyond assigning
proprietary control to new financial instruments. It also applies to
using computers to effectuate sometimes quite conventional business activity.10 2 It is almost as though after the telephone was invented a merchant could have patented a process for making a sale
by answering the phone and recording the customer's order, name
and address. The first merchant to do that was an innovator, but
should he have been empowered to block further, related innovation for the better part of two decades? Nor does patent protection
appear necessary to encourage entrepreneurs to initiate new business methods. It is hard to make a case that under-investment in
developing business methods is a market failure that distorts allocation-that American entrepreneurs put too much into carrying
on business in conventional ways and too little into generating
B2B or e-commerce approaches. Computer oriented adaptations
of conventional business methods were highly dynamic without
the encouragement of patent protection. This new legal climate
promises more harm than good.
3. Non-Obviousness as a Bar to Patentabilityof Computer-Related
Inventions
Of course, both software patents and business method patents should not issue or be valid unless the claimed invention is
non-obvious. How effective this screen will ultimately be remains
to be seen. Certainly the plethora of seemingly trivial patents being granted for computer related business methods provides little
basis for predicting that the PTO will prevent gratuitous overprotection. Few of the patents currently being granted show any
inventive spark beyond gaining some efficiency by using comThe danger that nonputers for quite conventional tasks.
obviousness will not be an effective screen for patents (such as
102 See, e.g., the Hartman patent, a "Method and System for Placing
a Purchase Order via a
Communications Network," U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999). See also Bulkeley, supra note 101.
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that approved for Signature in State Street Bank) that recite a
mathematical algorithm is also real. Citing Julie Cohen, Lemley
and his colleagues stress that the hypothetical person skilled in the
art (against whom non-obviousness is tested) must be assumed to
know of the algorithm, to have intended to solve the problem the
invention solves, and to do so with a computer. 103 Absent rigor
such as this in applying the test for non-obviousness, almost any
machine or process claim that passes the State Street Bank subject
matter test-any useful, concrete, tangible transformation of some
data may seem patentable. As yet, there is no sign of such rigor in
applying non-obviousness by the PTO. The hope that judicial
challenges will be able to plug the leak provides small comfort,
given the cost of patent litigation, the barrier effect that portfolios
of numerous patents can have on a market, even when the patents
are not all concentrated in the same hands, the difficulty and expense of uncovering relevant prior art in these novel fields, and the
presumption of validity granted by the statute 1°4 but unearned
when PTO procedures are porous.
B. Copyright Law
The most blatant over-protection afforded by computer copyrights is the seventy year-plus period of protection. 1° 5 This is
much longer than needed to encourage optimum investment in
developing software. Fortunately the risk of allocative harm is
reduced because the market life cycle of most software tends to
make the protection obsolete during much of the term. Still, an
operating system or application program that has become a standard can sometimes be sustained for lengthy periods through generational upgrades or other strategies. This can delay and increase
the expense to competitors relying on reverse engineering to commercialize competitive or interoperative programs. Furthermore,
the automatic nature of copyright protection 0 6 can increase the
103 See LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 333-34 (quoting
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering
and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1169 (1995)).
104 See § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, to which
the Federal Circuit has given substantial
force as policy. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 812 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 282 (1994)) (establishing a presumption of validity for patents and setting out defenses
to infringement). See also Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the FederalCircuit's
Patent Decisions, 1982-1994, 5 FED. CtR. BAR. J. 151 (1995) (discussing whether the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is biased in favor of patents).
Currently the term of a copyright is life of the author plus seventy
years; for unidentified or fictitious authors or for works made for hire, it is the shorter of ninety-five years from
first publication or one hundred twenty years from creation.
106 Under §102 of the Copyright Act, copyright subsists
as soon as the work is fixed in a
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barrier effect of software patent portfolios. Even the developer
who prevails on non-infringement or invalidity grounds after expensive litigation may remain vulnerable under copyright if the
plaintiff's code is similar and was accessible to the defendant.
Decisions about copyrightability that were made early in the
development of software appear with hindsight to have been bad
policy. 0 7 No doubt a program expressed in English or another
modem language would, if creative enough, meet the literal subject matter requirement for copyright. So, too, if a sufficient creative program were reduced to an expressive flow chart. The same
line of reasoning might warrant copyrightability of creative source
code, also readable by humans knowing the language. That literal
copying of elements of these might infringe seems sound as a matter of statutory construction. But object code-the language used
to enable a machine to talk to another machine-performs a utilitarian, technical function much like a standard "H" gear in an
automobile. It can be far better rationalized as an uncopyrightable
"method of operation" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) than as a "literary
work" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).10 8 Moreover, anything that can
be fixed in object code could also have been wired into the computer's hardware. Indeed, choices between software and hardware
are based solely on cost and efficiency. And certainly if the
"communication" (i.e., the signals to a machine's switches) expressed in object code were a hard-wired component of the machine itself, courts would not likely have characterized it as authorship. Additionally, when the object code in question is an operating system, the argument for classifying it as an uncopyrightable system or method of operation (though rejected in Apple v.

tangible medium.
The story of early Copyright Office doubt about software copyrightability,
and, the
Congressional decision to establish the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright
("CONTtY') is implicated, and that Commission's conclusion that copyright already subsisted in
software is criticized, and resulting policy concerns are noted in Pamela Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: the Case Against Copyright Protectionfor ComputerProgramsin Machine Readable
Form, 1984 DuKE I.J. 663.
103 Although the case against copyrightability of machine readable object
code is strongest,
given the utilitarian character of software, even when expressed in English, a flow chart, or a
programming language, it will focus on function and means without expressive flourish. The
critical line to be drawn is between elements appropriately called authorship (expressive material) and elements better characterized, in the terms of § 102(b), as an unprotectable "idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery." 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1994). See Peter S.Menell, An Epitaphfor Traditional Copyright Protectionof Netivork FeaturesofComputer Sofnvare, 43 ANTrrRUST BULL.651,667-80 (1998).
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Franklin Computer Corp.,10 9 now widely accepted as settled law)
is even more compelling logically. After all, given that the machine cannot function without it, the operating system is as embedded a part of the machine as is its power source. While there
may be no realistic likelihood that this object code issue, or the
source code variant of it, will be explicitly reconsidered either by
the courts or Congress, the distinct limits to and weakness of the
arguments which brought the law to where it is today stand as a
suitable backdrop for some of the issues that should be, and may
well still be, open to allocatively useful development. Below,
some of these are discussed.
1. Abstracting and Screening out UnprotectableElements
When the copyrightability of object code is being evaluated,
elements of originality are essential to pass muster under the constitutionally mandated Fiest "creativity" test. The originality requirement of § 102(a) is not met merely by not copying from
someone else, or by expending large amounts of effort or money to
complete the task.
Moreover, this constitutional requirement
strongly implies that the technical skill of a programmer is no better substitute for creative expression than is substantial effort or
investment. Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co. 1 0 held that a compilation of white page telephone numbers
arranged alphabetically by surname, followed by addresses and
phone numbers, was so lacking in creativity as to be denied protection even against literal copying."i Although much more complex
than compiling phone numbers, software design is also a utilitarian
112
task, as the Second Circuit recognized in Computer Associates.
There, defendant, by reverse engineering an application program,
designed with different code an alternative program that achieved
the same result. The issue was whether defendant had taken so
much of the structure, sequence and organization of the code as to
constitute non-literal, yet illicit, copying. The court recognized
See 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding computer program written in object
code as
suitable for copyright protection). But see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807,
815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (noting that the first
question in determining a computer program copyright issue is whether code, such as a menu
command hierarchy, as a whole can be copyrighted at all).
109

110 499 U.S. 340
(1991).

I See Fiest, 499 U.S. at 340-41. See also BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g
Corp. v. Donnelley
Info. Pub1'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (holding that business and geographic classifications in yellow page telephone directory not sufficiently creative).
11 See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992).
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that many of the individual elements in utilitarian software will be
dictated by functionality or efficiency, others by the requirements
of compatibility with the hardware or the operating system or in1 13
teroperability needs, and still others drawn from a public domain
(i.e. made up either of old elements or ones which, though new,
were so obvious as to be scenes a faire accessible to any skilled
software designers). Because it thought none of these elements
protectable, the court designed an abstraction-filtrationcomparison test:114 Break both the copyrighted and accused software down into the routines and subroutines from which they were
constructed. Remove all of the unprotectable elements. Then a
similar procedure emphasizing the first element-filtration-could
be used preliminarily, thus applying the Fiest test at the outset.
Break the copyrighted software into its constituent building
blocks. Eliminate everything un-copyrightable on every ground
other than lack of creativity. Then ask: (1) whether there is anything left that is sufficiently creative so that were it copied there
would be an infringement and (2) whether the sequence in which
un-copyrightable elements are combined into a functional whole is
sufficiently creative so that if the sequence were copied there
would be an infringement. This would rivet attention on the constitutional need for creativity to protect either a routine or the
manner in which routines are combined. If this approach were
used by a court also mindful that there is reason to doubt the logic
of protecting object code by copyright at all-that many of the
arguments for such protection, because they stress programmer
skill, are but refined versions of the "sweat of the brow" theory
that Fiest flatly rejects-an increased sensitivity to the need to
balance protection against the value of ex post competition could
well result.
2. CharacterizingInitially in § 102(b) Terms
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland InternationalInc.,115 a
First Circuit case affirmed four to four by the Supreme Court, held
that a hierarchy of numerous commands in a spread sheet interface
constituted a "method of operation," un-copyrightable under §
102(b).11 6 The decision accepts, in this interface context, the ar113 See U at 707-11.
114

115

See id. at 706-08.
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).

16 Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 815. Lotus is insightfully discussed in LEMLEY,
supra
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gument that Apple v. Franklin rejected when urged as a basis for
classifying all operating systems as un-copyrightable. The Lotus
opinion is in tension with opinions in other circuits, including
Computer Associates. The Computer Associates analysis, if cautiously used in planning and counseling at the reverse engineering
stage, and aggressively used at the litigation stage, could free a
good deal of software from copyright. This will be so especially if
Fiest, when applied to software, were construed either to raise the
originality bar significantly or to reject technical skill as itself
creative. Yet, the Lotus approach, if ultimately validated, might
well keep considerably more software of all kinds in the public
domain. Once the characterization is made that invokes § 102(b)
the debate is over. If a menu tree structure, like that in Lotus can,
as a whole, be characterized as a method of operation, what else
might as appropriately be so characterized: A status screen? A
user interface? A protocol? And what of the other § 102(b) categories of un-copyrightable elements: procedure, process, system?
Might one or more of these cover substantial parts of some software? By contrast, the abstraction and filtration process, although
it can screen much out, might allow considerable material to continue enjoying copyright protection that, under a spacious use of
the Lotus approach, might be "filtered" at the outset. Concern for
efficient allocation and consumer protection supports such a tightening of copyright protection for software. Given the special elements of the new economy, where software lives out its commercial life, IP protection, due to network externalities and standard
status can yield considerable market power, an ex post reward far
in excess of that needed to encourage sufficient software investment. Such over-protection results in allocative harm and consumer injury.
Whether the Lotus approach will be accepted by a Supreme
Court majority is hard to predict. Some current justices, including
some in the usual conservative majority, might respond favorably
to arguments about allocative harm due to over protection. Also,
Lotus can be linked in interesting ways to Fiest, a unanimous decision and an opinion concurred in by eight justices of the Court.
The hierarchy of several command terms, for which Lotus sought a
copyright shield, became competitively significant only because,
once accepted as a standard, they yielded network effects. When
originally selected, the hierarchical order was likely chosen for

note 13, at 164-67.
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convenience (i.e., either for efficiency and/or functionality) or
more or less randomly. Certainly the terms had no competitive
value based on expressive felicity. Any alternative way of expressing them would suit any competitor as well. Only after network effects kicked in did access to them become significant. In
short, interfaces and protocols are not likely to have much in the
way of authorship or creativity about them. Therefore, accepting
the § 102(b) "method of operation" characterization for interfaces
and protocols would be supported by Fiest. Moreover, these allobringing the
catively wholesome goals could be achieved without
11 7
Apple v. Franklinholding directly into question.
fT.

CONVERGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS AND
DISPARATE REGULATORY REGIMES

Broadband transport (which the Telecommunication Act of
1996 denominates "advanced telecommunications capability" and
defines to cover "high speed, switched, high quality voice, data,
1' 8
graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology")
can utilize a variety of public and private transmission paths and
protocols. It was such advanced services, including the use of
these channels for Internet connection, to which Judge Posner apparently referred when he included communications in the new
economy that confronts antitrust with institutional problems.1 9
My purpose, here, is to emphasize that regulatory interventions at
the federal, state, and even municipal levels have as much or more
of an effect on competition in broadband markets than does antitrust. In Part UI.A., below, the elements of the broadband network
are described; in Part fII.B. interconnection, unbundling, and open
access policies are discussed and evaluated; and in Part LII.C. a
role for the Antitrust Division of DOJ is considered.
117

In addition to Fiest, 499 U.S. at 340 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.

569 (1994), the Supreme Court has shown that it is alert to the competitive and welfare risks of
excessive IP protection in several other opinions during the last decade. See TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001) (stating that prior utility patent was strong
evidence that claimed features are functional, thus precluding trade dress protection); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-12 (2000) (finding that functionality,
including aesthetic functionality in product configuration, precludes trade dress protection);
Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135, 144-45 (1998) (holding that the
first sale doctrine trumps implication from § 622(a) of Copyright Act).
118 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706(c)(1) (codified as a note
to § 157 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 157 (1996)).
19 See PosnerArticle,supra note 1, at 925 ("[T]he enforcement agencies and the
courts do
not have adequate technical resources, and do not move fast enough, to cope effectively with a
very complex business sector that changes very rapidly.").
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A. The Structure of the BroadbandNetwork
Broadband accommodates packet switching like that on
which the Internet is based. In its Second Report on the Deployment of Advance Telecommunication, 120 the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") described broadband as including
backbone, middle mile, last mile, and last hundred feet-four vertical levels and their interconnections, analogizing to auto paths
from interstate highways, to driveways. Backbone includes transport over fiber optic lines of great capacity constructed along public rights of way and provided by firms like Cable & Wireless,
AT&T, WorldCom, Genuity, Sprint, and others, as well as satellite
wireless backbone with similar capacity. Middle mile facilities
interconnect traffic from last mile aggregation points to backbone
(or directly to other middle mile carriers), mostly over fiber optic
lines built for ordinary telephone or cable traffic, although there
are also fixed wireless and satellite connections at this level.
Last mile connection services are now widely available to
businesses and residents using digital subscriber lines ("DSLs")
provided by both incumbent and competitive local exchange carriers ("ILECs" and "CLECs"), and cable modem service offered by
cable companies.
Though most businesses use DSL (because
they lack cable connections), cable is the principal broadband provider to residential users. Other technologies (e.g., terrestrial and
satellite wireless) are feasible and being used to some extent, although satellite-unless enhanced by an expensive transmitting
antenna-is "downstream" to the subscriber only and depends on
telephone for upstream connections initiated by the subscriber.
The various regulatory regimes which impact the business of
providing broadband have not converged as rapidly or thoroughly as
have the relevant markets. Today, some broadband participants cannot be sure what agency may regulate what aspect of their activities
under what statute or ordinance. While competitive issues could occur and the antitrust laws would apply at any vertical stage in the provision of broadband, the issues on which regulatory intervention is
most significant arise at the "last mile," the local communications
delivery network. The major concern is whether interconnection,
120 INQUIRY CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
FCC

SECOND REP. NO. 00290, available at 2000 WL 1199533 (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter SECOND
REP.].
121

See id. at 128-39.
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unbundling and open access are required. Until the regulatory
apparatus itself is brought to order, such issues will not be
The defining necessity for advance (i.e.,
satisfactorily resolved.
broadband) service, in the view of the FCC, is a capacity to provide
high-speed packet switch transmission in both directions, as measured
by bandwidth in excess of 200 kilobits per second. That speed is
sufficient to exclude ISDN service, the highest speed generally
available from LECs when the Telecommunications Act of 1996122
became law and, indeed, a speed which the asymmetrical DSL
service most used by residential subscribers attains only
downstream-data directed to and downloaded at the residence-not
upstream.
While there are differences among all the services available
for Internet connections (including dial up telephone, still used by
most resident subscribers), and while dial up, ISDN and even
asymmetrical DSL (much used by residential subscribers) do not
fully meet the FCC definition of advanced service, all means of
linking computers (or other devices) to the Internet constitute a
market which could support significant price and service competition among alternative providers. There will be different geographic markets and in some areas the available alternatives to dial
up service may be very limited. There may also be sub-marketsperhaps grouping households and small business subscribers and
differentiating these from larger commercial enterprises, perhaps
also separating out users for which only very high speeds will do.
Despite such issues, to introduce the discussion of interconnection,
unbundling, and open access which follows, it is enough to recognize that competition is already occurring between dial up and
ISDN telephone, cable modem, and DSL suppliers, and that suppliers of other broadband technologies are potential entrants. Additional competition could and probably will occur.
B. Interconnection, Unbundling, and Open Access on the Broadband
LastMile
While the FCC views broadband as nascent, by August 2001
almost five percent of U.S. households (over ten percent of those
connected to the Internet) will have been carried there by broadband; over half by cable modem. Almost forty-five percent will be
using used DSL, ISDN, dedicated leased lines or other telephone
technologies. The remainder, slightly less than five percent, will
122 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Titles 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
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link by satellite or other spectrum based technologies. 123 This is a
significant broadband build out, although large additional investment will be needed to complete it. 124 Already in regulatory hands
are inter-modal, intra-cable, and intra-telephone competition issues. These are discussed below in reverse order.
1. Telephone Broadband
The salient intra-telephone competitive questions are: (1)
whether ILECs, both because of their dominant positions in conventional local telephone service and because a local loop is also
necessary for DSL service, have or can rapidly attain bottleneck
positions in telephone broadband; (2) if so, whether interconnection of their packet switched service with such services offered by
CLECs should be required; and (3) whether unbundled access for
CLECs to particular ILEC broadband elements should be mandated in order to accommodate entry by effective competitors.
Consider this hypothetical: Oldtel, an ILEC, offers analog,
circuit-switched voice (plain old telephone) and packet-switched
broadband services in its region by routing packet-switched data
over the high frequency portion of the same lines that carry analog
voice at a lower frequency. Newtel, a CLEC, with its own fiber
optic lines and switching facilities in some densely used segments
of Oldtel's area, and which has an interconnection agreement with
Oldtel for circuit-switched voice traffic, seeks to interconnect also
for broadband. Additionally, Nichetel, a CLEC with packetswitching capacity and marketing experience, wants to compete
with Oldtel only in providing broadband and asks Oldtel to unbundle the high frequency portion of its loop and sell unbundled access to Nichetel at wholesale rates so that it can offer a competi123
17A

See KANG, supranote 12, at 496.
See generally id. Each of these means of broadband connection has strengths and

weaknesses. While backbone and middle mile fiber build-out has been massive, not so for the
final mile where some CLECs in concentrated areas have used fiber, but ILECs as well as
CLECs seeking wider voice service generally have not. However, both ISDN (128-Kbps over
circuit-switched voice network) and DSL (128-Kbps to 8-Mbps over a high frequency packetswitched network over the same line as the voice network) enable fast transmission over copper
lines at modest cost and are the major solution for telephone suppliers. 1SDN can be provided
anywhere that dial-up telephone is available. DSL can be provided only within, roughly, three
miles of a switching station (which covers roughly 80% of telephone subscribers). A hybrid
fiber-coaxial build out of cable systems provides a high-speed (maximum 27-Mbps downstream, 10-Mbps upstream, reducing with increase in traffic on the shared line) data service with
cable modems. See also Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: BroadbandInfrastructure and
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 721 (1999) (discussing high-speed broadband telecommunication service and regulation).
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tive DSL service to customers subscribing to Oldtel's voice service.
Suppose there were no regulatory regime and refusals by
Oldtel to comply with Newtel's interconnection and Nichetel's
unbundling request were challenged under the Sherman Act. How
would they be analyzed? First, the market would be defined,
probably much as suggested in Part ]II.A. above. Concentration
ratios would then be computed and entry barriers evaluated. Only
if Oldtel were a monopolist and its broadband and related assets
warranted labeling the denied facilities both essential and irreplaceable, would refusal of interconnection raise any serious issue. 125 As to monopoly power, any existing broadband competition in the relevant geographic market either from CLECs, cable
modems, or others would loom large, any slower competitive telephonic Internet connection would be significant and any potential
broadband entry at least relevant. If essential and irreplaceable
characterizations were warranted, analysis would proceed much as
it did in the case against AT&T that led to divestiture.1 26 At this
analytical stage, the risk that requiring interconnection would
dampen ILEC incentives to continue the build out would be evaluated as an efficiency related business justification for any refusal.
The capacity of a forced access remedy to generate meaningful
competition would also be subject to an efficacy review. Would
providing interconnection for Newtel create an effective competitor? Would granting Nichetel's request provide competition that
might, in time, find its own alternatives for all or part of the now
essential Oldtel facilities, or only one that would remain largely a
reseller? In short, analysis under the antitrust laws would be complex, but manageable. The case for interconnection with Newtel
would seem strong, that for unbundling for sale to Nichetel arguable, but weaker. The principal institutional strain imposed by
both claims would pertain to how the reasonable price for interconnection or access should be established if, on the merits, essential facilities relief were warranted.
See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973)
(stating that
interconnection with and unbundled provision of some of the services offered by an integrated
utility exercising monopoly power under a publicly issued franchise required under the Sherman
Act). See also SLLLIVAN AND GRnMIs, supra note 54, § 3.4(b)(3), at 110-14 (discussing access
to essential facilities).
United States v. AT&T, 522 F. Supp. 131, 225 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding
that proposed
antitrust consent decree ordering divestiture by telecommunications corporation of local operating companies is in the public interest). See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 291
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
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Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, these
issues are shunted to the FCC. The Act establishes a framework
for competition in local telephone markets through statutory requirements and implementing rules made by the FCC.12 7 Most
relevant here, section 251 of the Act obligates ILECs to open their
networks to competition by providing interconnection, giving access to unbundled elements (when technically feasible and when
denial would impede competition), and making their own retail
services available to resellers at wholesale rates. 128 In a 1999 report and order, the FCC ruled that section 251 applied to advanced
services, required ILECs to interconnect packet-switched data traffic with ILECs and that, where a showing of feasibility and competitive impairment could be made, the Act's unbundling obligation would also apply. 129 In findings and conclusions that are not
models of complete consistency, the Commission noted, nevertheless, that several competitive local exchange carriers were providing service with their own packet switches. 130 It therefore concluded that the lack of competitive impairment precluded any general 3requirement
that ILECs unbundle packet switching functional1 1
ity.
In a later order, however, the Commission required ILECs
offering both circuit-switched voice and packet-switched broadband data channels over the same line to unbundle the high frequency data portion of the loop for any CLEC seeking to offer
only packet switched broadband service to customers using the
ILECs circuit-switched voice service. 132 The Commission found
that the impairment test was met because (unlike packet-switching
functionality, which CLECs could and were building out themselves) the ILECs seeking to offer only broadband services to customers subscribing to the ILECs voice telephone service would, if
1Z7 See Harvey L. Zuckman et al., The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, in MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 324 (1999).
128 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. V 1999) (requiring telecommunications
carriers to make
equipment and facilities available to other carriers).
129 Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunication
Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, 3698 (1999) [hereinafter Local Competitions Provisions] (reevaluating the unbundling
obligations of § 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
130 Local Competition Provisions, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3702.

Local Competition Provisions, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3707.
132 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability
and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 20914 (1999) [hereinafter Deployment of Wireline Services] (discussing line sharing obligations for incumbent LECs and establishing spectrum management policies
and rules).
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unbundling were not required, need to incur the high cost of building out the line only for their broadband service. 33 Competitive
impairment would thus result from the loss of the scope efficiencies available to the ILEC (that uses the same line for two services).
The Commission thus claims (and apparently has) discretion either to grant or, under its power to forebear applying any regulation or
provision of the act, to deny ILEC-CLEC advanced service interconnection, and to impose or refuse to impose unbundling duties either
for packet-switching functionality or for line sharing, or for both. Are
the Commission's decisions on these matters calculated to encourage
the development of broadband services and the development of last
mile competition? Should the predicate, even for interconnection for
advanced services, be that the ILEC controls a bottleneck; that broadband customers cannot turn to cable modem or wireless systems as
alternatives? Local loop dominance certainly remains a significant
bottleneck for conventional service to residential users, but does that
still substantial structural power migrate to broadband? Each of the
three discretionary calls made by the FCC is quite complex. ILECs
have substantial capital costs still ahead of them if they are to complete the broadband packet-switching build-out. CLECs have too,
whether or not they may rely, in part, on unbundled ILEC capabilities. As to each of the three choices, the analysis requires one (1) to
evaluate the likely effect on broadband investment by all LECs, both
ILECs and CLECs (taking account of broadband investment by cable
companies and others), and (2) if interconnection and unbundling
obligations are deemed to reduce aggregate LEC investment, but to
increase last mile competition, then to factor in the benefit of that
additional competition.
Manifestly, these are not easily manageable problems-less
manageable, perhaps, than those that would be encountered in a
conventional antitrust approach.
Despite the FCC's vaunted
expertise, industry experience, and data, and despite evidence that
it is identifying some of the right questions, the FCC's reports do
not indicate that its conclusions on the issues here discussed
constitute anything other than rough judgment calls. If nothing
sharper than that is feasible, perhaps forbearance is warranted
except in situations where, with the advice of the DOJ, the FCC
concludes that interconnection 134or unbundling is required by
conventional antitrust principles.
133 See Deployment of Vireline Services, 14 F.C.C.R.
at 20916-17.

47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1999) authorizes the FCC to forebear from
applying any
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2. Cable Broadband
The intra-cable broadband competitive issue differs from the
telecom question because it involves self-dealing by cable companies with ISPs that they own and denial of cable platform access to
unintegrated, competing ISPs. If this issue-whether an ISPintegrated cable company has an obligation to provide access to its
ISP competitors-were addressed under the antitrust laws, there
would be two plausible modes of analysis. An essential facilities
evaluation would entail the same inquiries and standards discussed
in Part III.B.1, above. But self-dealing by a vertically integrated
firm with market power that denies access to its up- or downstream
competitors raises an additional, less complex, yet more intrusive,
antitrust issue: Whether limiting access to its own subsidiary constitutes unlawful tying or exclusive dealing by the cable franchisee. Such a firm could have something close to a natural monopoly power in the multi-channel video program services market. In
broadband, however, it would have less power if other (telephonic
or spectrum-based) alternatives were available (or if most customers regarded a dial up Internet connection as viable). Nevertheless,
given that more than one-half of residential broadband connections
are by cable and that there are high regulatory barriers (as well as
investment barriers) to entry into any broadband technology, it is

regulation or provision of the act to a telecommunication carrier or telecommunication service if
it determines that (1) enforcement is not necessary to assure just, reasonable, non-discriminatory
prices, practices and classifications; (2) is not needed to protect consumers; and (3) is consistent
with the public interest. There are a number of circumstances in which it is appropriate for
regulatory agencies evaluating competition issues to borrow antitrust norms and standards. See
e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1994) (affirming refusal by
three judge panel to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which had authorized the consolidation of seven large motor carriers). See generally SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra
note 54, § 14.5, at 738 (discussing significant Supreme Court decisions about the application of
antitrust to issues of conduct and of structure in federally regulated industries). Whether market
forces, subject to antitrust, would be enough to assure and sustain effective competition in last
mile broadband is, of course, debatable. It is interesting to note, however, that interconnection
and access issues among Internet backbone suppliers have thus far been left to competitive
interaction, subject only to antitrust intervention to restructure mergers tending to increase
concentration. While an efficient backbone system depends on carriers interconnecting and
completing each other's traffic, this has been accomplished without any governmental (or concertedly established industry) rules by means of "peering" and "transit" contracts, apparently
with reasonable success.

See MICHAEL KENDE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING

INTERNET BACKBONE, 1 (FCC Offered Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 32, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.govlBureaus/OPP working-papers/oppwp32.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2001) (discussing internet connection arrangements). The biggest danger, were last mile broadband deregulated, would probably be lax antitrust enforcement, which has at times burdened
consumers following deregulation in other areas, for example, the airline industry.
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likely that most cable companies offering broadband Internet access would have sufficient market share to meet the standard
which Jefferson Parish implies would be needed for a tying violation under the section 1 of the Sherman Act. 135 But here, too, as
for telephone broadband, there is a regulatory overlay. Federal
and state regulatory statutes must be considered in dealing with
claims for open access to a cable modem platform. For cable
companies and competing ISPs, however, it is less clear than for
ILECs and CLECs in which agency that regulatory responsibility
reposes or from what statute its power derives.
Unlike telephone, cable has not traditionally been viewed as
a public utility; its regulation has differed considerably from telephone. Cable franchises are granted by state and municipal au136
thorities, subject to federal prohibition of exclusive franchises,
federal requirements that some channels be available for local
broadcast, 137 leased access, 138 and public interest, educational and
governmental programming,139 and shifting state-local/federal responsibilities for rate regulation. 40 Save for the ban on exclusives,
little in the regulatory tradition fosters competitive entry into cable. Nor, other than the narrowly focused must-carry, channel
dedication, and limited leased access rules, does conventional cable regulation suggest interconnection, unbundling, or other open
access obligations, or imply any inhibition on self-preference by
vertically integrated cable carriers. Nonetheless, as LECs and ca135 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
31-32 (1984) (holding that
hospital's exclusive contract with an anesthesiologist does not violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act). See also United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 17137 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.LW. 3107
(U.S. Aug. 17, 2001) (No 01-236) (evaluating tying under the rule of reason laid out by the
court of appeals would be more complex); supratext accompanying note 61.
136 See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) 1 (1994) ("A franchising authority may award, in accordance
with the provisions of this subchapter, except that a franchising authority may not grant an
exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise.").
137 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring cable
operators to carry
commercial television signals and non-commercial educational television).
38 See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("A cable operator shall designate channel

capacity for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the operator ... ").
139 See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing a franchising
authority to designate channel capacity for public, educational or government use).
140 Before 1984, rate regulation was a state and local matter with no federal statutory role.
In 1984, Congress deregulated premium channels, permitted state-local regulation of basic tier
prices only if there was not effective competition as defined by the FCC, a power the FCC
exercised to effectively deregulate about 97% of basic service. In 1992 Congress authorized
local authorities to regulate rates subject to FCC established formulas. See KANG, supra note
12, at 154-61 (discussing cable television regulation).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:41

ble companies build out their broadband capabilities, the question
arises whether cable companies that own a proprietary ISP unduly
injure competition by declining the broadband cable platform to
competing ISPs. 141 Just as the ILEC unbundling issue is assigned
primarily to a regulatory solution, this ISP access question may be
also. But while Congress clearly placed the ILEC-CLEC relationship with the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934142 as
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which regulatory standards apply and which regulatory agency has responsibility for the cable company-ISP relationship are both debatable issues. Although the FCC has some regulatory responsibilities for
cable, 4 3 open access for cable broadband is not one where it has a
statutory mandate. In 1998, in connection with the AT&T/TCI
merger, the FCC displayed its intention to refrain from regulating
cable modem service. 144 By contrast, some local franchise authorities have shown a disposition to insist on such open access. 145
Since then, a serious question has arisen whether cable modem
data transport service is not a telephone service, subject to FCC's
telephone, rather than its cable jurisdiction. 146 In 2000, the ComIn addition to the legal issues, note that there has been considerable debate
on the policy
issues. See infra text accompanying notes 125-35. See also Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence
Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband
Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 929-30 (2001) (arguing that open access needed to preserve end to
end architecture of the Internet); Shelanski, supra note 124, at 721 (stating that regulation of
advanced services may slow residential broadband deployment); William E. Kennard, then FCC
Chairman, The Road Not Taken: Building a Broadband Future for America, Remarks at the
Meeting of the National Cable Television Association (June 15, 1999), at
http:llwww.fcc.gov/SpeecheslKennardlspwek921.html (stating that open access would create
uncertainty and slow down the cable build out).
142 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat.1064 (1934).
143 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 136-40. The Commission has also often
141

successfully claimed a regulatory authority over cable in order to protect broadcast TV from
excessive competition. See Stanley M. Bensen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of
Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77,78 (1981).
144 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to
the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. GN Dkt No. 00-1855, (August 12, 2001) at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publiclattachmatchlFCC-00-355Al.pdf [hereinafter High-Speed
Access]. See also Kennard, supranote 141.
145 See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that
state cable authorities could not condition franchise transfer and operator's provision of standard
cable service on maintaining open access of its cable broadband network to competitors).
146 In statutory terms, the question is whether a cable modem
link to the Internet is a "cable
service" as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) and thus subject to regulation
by state or local franchise authorities, a "telecommunications service," as defined in 47 U.S.C. §
153 (46), and thus subject to regulation only by the FCC. As suggested in KANG, supranote 12,
at 508-09, there are also other possibilities: an "information service" (47 U.S.C. § 153(20)
(Supp. V 1999)) or an "interactive computer service" (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (Supp. V 1999)).
The relevant provisions were drafted without foresight that telephone and cable service would
converge to the extent that they have in the broadband market.
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mission opened an inquiry into whether it should so conclude and
adopt an appropriate regulation. 47
In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland,148 the Ninth Circuit held
that the Portland franchising authority could not condition TCI's
transfer of its cable franchise to AT&T upon AT&T's grant of unrestricted access to its broadband transmission facilities for ISPs
other than @Home, AT&T's own proprietary service. 149 Portland's jurisdiction to do so depended on whether broadband service on a cable platform is a "cable service," defined in the Act as:
(1) one-way video transmission to subscribers of video or other
programming service made available to all subscribers and (2)
subscriber interaction, if any, required for the selection or use of
video programming or other programming service.150 The court
read this as limiting cable service, in essence, to one-way transmission to subscribers, who presumably interacted little beyond
turning the set on and selecting a channel. ISPs like @Home provide much more, including accessing Web pages, navigating hypertext links, corresponding via e-mail, and accessing chat groups.
All this, the court concluded, could not be crammed under the cable service definition.' 5' Assuming the court's conclusion is correct (and it seems reasonable if not inevitable), power to order
open access does not exist in state or local franchise authorities.
The opinion also addressed another issue, one implicitly
raised. It ruled that the city could not condition AT&T's offering
of standard cable service on broadband open access. It concluded
that conventional ISP activities are an "information service" as
defined in the Act15 2 when they link their customers to the Internet.
Thus, integrated cable companies, in providing the ISP service, are
not subject to regulation as telecommunications service providers

See High-Speed Access, supra note 144, at 1-3 (requesting public and
industry comment on a large array of technical legal and competition policy questions about whether open
access would be feasible or appropriate).
148 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
149 See iU. at 880. But cf. Gulf Power Co. v.
FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 877 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 00-832) (holding that cable Internet
access neither a cable service nor a telecommunication service). See also Media One Group,
Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp 712 (E.D. Va. 2000), aftid, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that cable Internet access service is a cable service).
]so 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1994 & Supp.
V 1999).
151 SeeAT&T, 216 F.3d
at 876-77.
152 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (Supp. V 1999) (defining
information service as offering
capability for "generating, acquiring, sharing, transforming, processing retrieving, utilizing or
maldng available information via telecommunication .... ").
147
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either.1 53 Up to this point, the court's conclusion was consistent
with that reached earlier by the Universal Service Board that
makes recommendations to the FCC.1 54 However, the court went
on to hold that, to the extent that @Home "provides its subscribers
Internet transmission over its cable broadband facility," it is providing telecommunication service as defined in the Act.1 55 This
being so, Portland's efforts to regulate was preempted by 47
U.S.C. §§ 541(b)(3) 156and 253(a).1 57 The implication would seem
to be that cable companies offering interactive broadband are
common carriers that ought to be regulated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, much as are CLECs offering DSL. Whether
this will result in an FCC decision to require open access is yet to
be finally resolved. 158
3. Inter Modal Broadband Competition: Is Regulation Tilting the
Playing Field?
A contention frequently made in favor of giving ISPs open,
common carrier-like access to cable modern platforms is that to
subject all broadband telephone to common carrier obligations,
and interconnection duties and to hold ILECs subject to unbundling, while freeing cable of all such duties, tilts the playing field
in favor of cable. This, it is argued, encourages investment in cable broadband while discouraging such investment by ILECs and
CLECs, thereby threatening a less than optimum mix of resources.
When regulation affects competitive or potentially competitive
modalities differently, there is always a risk of distorting market
outcomes. But there seems little data available from which the
seriousness of this risk for alternative broadband technologies
153
154

See AT&T, 216 F.3d at 878-79.
See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11507-11508,

73 (Apr. 10, 1998) (finding that Internet access services are appropriately classified as information, rather than telecommunications services).
155 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. V 1999) (defining telecommunications
as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the users choosing,
without change" in form or content). See also 47 U.S.C. §153 (44) (Supp. V 1999) (defining a
"telecommunications carrier" as "any provider of telecommunications services"); 47 U.S.C. §
153(46) (Supp. V 1999) (defining such services as the offering directly to the public of "telecommunications for a fee").
156 See 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999) (forbidding a franchise
authority from
imposing any requirement "prohibiting, linking, restricting or conditioning" a cable operator
from offering telecommunication services).
157 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. V 1999) (forbidding any state
or local authority from
prohibiting any entity from providing any telecommunication service).
158 See High-Speed Access, supra
note 144.
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could be evaluated. Build-out is proceeding, seemingly apace, in
both DSL and cable modem technologies. Indeed, it may well be
that build-out by either prompts responsive investment by the
other.
If the AT&T case is correct that a state may not compel open
access and that transmitting to the Internet by cable modem is a
telecommunication service, the FCC would likely have power to
level the playing field by forbearing from imposing interconnection and unbundling obligations on ILECs, CLECs or cable companies (operating as CLECs). This would be a simpler solution,
technologically, than trying to impose interconnection and unbundling duties on both telephone company and cable company
broadband providers. But it would probably give ILECs with residential loops a considerable advantage over CLECs without them.
4. Summarizing, Clarifying, and Deciding
Antitrust standards might well impose interconnection but
not unbundling obligations on ILEC broadband and would likely
impose open access to cable broadband platforms for ISPs seeking
to compete with ISPs integrated with the cable carrier, but it would
not likely open cable platforms to interconnection by horizontal
broadband competitors.
Set against this hypothetical antitrust
background, the FCC decision to open ILEC broadband to CLEC
interconnection seems reasonable, at least unless a forceful factual
case could be made that this obligation leads to distortion by shifting broadband investment away from telephone to cable. As an
economic matter, the wisdom of the FCC's decision to require limited unbundling by ILECs may be debatable, but given the thrust
of the 1996 amendments toward opening local telephone services
to competition, it, too, is at least defensible, absent a showing of
harmful shifting of investment from telephone to cable. By contrast, antitrust standards would not likely obligate cable to open its
broadband service to interconnection by horizontal competitors.
On the other hand, obliging ISP-integrated cable companies
to open their broadband service to competing ISPs would be indicated on antitrust and on other grounds. First, as antitrust analysis
suggests, it is competitively sound given cable company power and
integration. Second, it would partially level the broadband playing
field (since LECs, as common carriers, must accommodate all
ISPs). Third, the Internet protocols, as the AT&T opinion notes,
construct an architecture based on maintaining a network neutral
as to the data it transmits (the so-called "end to end" principle,
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where no control intervenes between the source and the destination). 159 When ISP access is obtained through a LEC, a common
carrier, the same principle applies. It would be inconsistent with
that protocol and somewhat anomalous to allow a cable company
linking a customer to the Internet to impose control not available
to LECs. Indeed, it may be, as Lemley and Lessig argued first to
the FCC 160 and have since supported more fully and forcefully in
an article, 161 that maintaining this neutral architecture is important
to the continued growth of the Internet and to the innovative competition it invites and sustains.
C. A Role for One of the AntitrustAgencies
The resolution of telephone and cable broadband regulatory
issues being raised about interconnection, unbundling and open
access may significantly affect the state of competition in this new
economy segment. The trend of decisions on these issues should
be monitored by one of the antitrust enforcement agencies, both of
which are competent to evaluate whether effective competition is
being facilitated or perhaps inhibited by the regulatory interventions. This role might be particularly appropriate for the FTC,
given its position as an independent agency and the traditional
expectancy that it be available for studies useful to Congress and
the executive departments. Yet, since most of the issues arise under the shadow of the 1996 amendments to the Communications
Act of 1934, the DOJ's experience with the telephone industry and
its statutory role under that Act probably make it the more appropriate agency to take on such a task.
CONCLUSION

Speaking about antitrust and the new economy, Lawrence
Summers recently reminded his audience of the wise Hippocratic
dictum, "first do no harm."' 62 That is sound advice in any context,
159

See AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir.
2000).

160 Application for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses
Media One Group, Inc. to

AT&T Corp., FCC CS Dkt. No. 99-251 (Nov. 10, 1999) (ex parte declaration by Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig), available at http:lgullfoss2.fcc.gov/prodlecfsretrieve.
cgi?native..or._pdf-pdf&id -document=6010050443.
See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 141, at 929-32. See also Lawrence
Lessig, Architecting Innovation, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 397, 403 (2001) (noting that the new internet innovations
are being built "to empower strategic action by network owners, built to undermine the neutrality of the original regime").
162 Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the
New Economy, 69 ANTrrRusT L.J.
353, 358 (2001).
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but of the three areas of competition policy here discussed, it is
least needed in regard to antitrust. In that area, the law is indeed
supple and its basic rules essentially sound. With available microeconomic theory and manageable empirical inquiry, particular new
economy markets can be well enough understood so that these
rules may be effectively applied. Institutional problems are real
but need not overwhelm.
In two other areas of competition policy, the outlook is less
sanguine. As even strong supporters of free markets sometimes
forget, intellectual property is a comprehensive regulatory intervention. It, too, was designed for a simpler economy. Unfortunately, IP regulation lacks the suppleness of antitrust. Explicit
statutory provisions can mandate outcomes without opportunity for
a cost-benefit analysis taking market particulars into account.
While there is some room for judicial adjustments where antitrust
and IP interact, and, perhaps, even in the application of IP alone at
points where characterizations are debatable, 163 to adequately protect new economy competition from distortion, legislative change
in the IP system may well be needed. So, too, with broadband
competition. Today, broadband is affected by two different
regulatory regimes each designed for its own distinctive market,
without recognition or expectation that these markets would
converge. Here, again, legislative adjustment is indicated.
For both IP and broadband the interim solution may well be
to accept Hippocratic guidance by attuning both IP and broadband
regulation as closely as current statutes permit to the basic policy
goal and analytical tools that imbue antitrust. That goal is generally consistent with IP theory, though much telecommunications
regulation may make it difficult to adapt to it. Wise restraints are
those that serve allocative efficiency and consumer welfare. Rule
of reason analysis, informed by an understanding of market particulars and open to all relevant analytical tools, is the best way to
identify these restraints. Any discretion available to those administering the IP and broadband regulatory systems should be responsive to this approach.
The long run solution may be less obvious. A thorough
study of patent administration and patent policy seems essential;
perhaps the FCC could initiate this. More generally, Congress
might do more serious balancing of costs and benefits when it considers IP amendments. Perhaps, indeed, Congress could build
163 See the fuller discussion in SULLIVAN & GRIMES,
supra note 54, § 15.1, at 800
(evaluating the effectiveness of IP and antitrust goals and enforcement in high tech markets).
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some suppleness into major IP statutes, thus reducing the compulsion on courts to grant excessive protections. And certainly
broadband regulatory statutes could be amended to take account of
inter-modal convergence and to tie FCC discretion to consumer
welfare and efficiency.

